Conspiracy Narratives and the Discursive Identity of ‘the Other’ in Tunisian Political Populism
Chahira Ben Abdallah
Introduction
In the last decade, the return to conspiracy theory has coincided with nationalist and identity reversals driven by racism and hate. At the same time, there has been a steady increase in the diffusion of conspiracy theories in political communication. Consequently, there has been a surge in the number of studies tackling the use of conspiracy theories by political actors as a communication strategy. These studies have highlighted the fact that beliefs in conspiracy theories are very often associated with populism (Van Prooijen, 2018; Oliver & Rahn, 2016; Merkley, 2020). In fact, the hypothesis of an “elective affinity” between populism and conspiratorial ideas is old and can be traced back to the American literature on populism in the mid-1950s (Ivaldi, 2021). However, the adoption of conspiracy theories by populists in the twenty-first century is attributed to Donald Trump's populism in the United States, which has relied heavily on conspiratorial ideas and the dissemination of fake news.
Conspiracy theories, such as those surrounding the origin of the COVID-19 virus and vaccines, as well as those related to immigration, such as the “Great Replacement” theory, have become an integral part of the ideological framework of both right-wing populist and non-populist politicians. In Italy, conspiracy theories were at the heart of the populist campaigns of the Lega as well as the M5S (Maccaferri, 2022). In France, Marine Le Pen's party did not hesitate, during the coronavirus pandemic, to denounce the "incompetence" and "lies" of the executive authority. Likewise, in Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro's management of the COVID-19 epidemic was very strongly marked by "scientific denialism" (Kaltwasser & Taggart, 2022).
These examples show the growing political relevance of conspiracy theories and the close connection between populism and conspiracy beliefs, “especially due to their common dichotomic nature” (Markou, 2022: 161) and “Manichean and antagonistic societal outlook” (Hameleers, 2020: 107). On that basis, our research aims to focus on the Tunisian political context in order to study “the specific case of the presidency of Kais Saied in Tunisia, which has been labelled as a form of constitutional populism integrating conspiracy theories” (Annovi, 2024: 43). We estimate that the conspiracy logic that Kais Saied frequently adopts is strategically exploited as a kind of “alternative reality” and a defense mechanism that he resorts to for strategic and pragmatic reasons.
Our analysis is based on the theory and methodological tools of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis, which examines populism as a reason/logic and considers the political opponent (other) as a central element in the analysis because it acquires a formative character in the formation of political discourse. We will rely on the key theoretical components of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of populism: antagonism, chain of equivalence, empty signifier, and the role of passions. This discursive approach, with the aim of showing the performative power and the persuasive appeal of conspiracy narratives in Kais Saied’s political communication, enables us to understand his “conspiracy rhetoric” (Goldzwig, 2002) or “conspiratorial imagination” (Jasmin, 2009).
Despite growing academic interest in the relationship between populism and conspiracy theories, and even though some studies have touched upon "conspiratorial populism" in the case of Kais Saied (Annovi, 2024; Kahlaoui, 2024; Sayfo & Kmeczko, 2026), there are, to the best of my knowledge, no studies that have examined Kais Saied’s discourse from the perspective of Laclau and Mouffe’s method. Thus, this study wants to fill this gap by using this well-known method to look at populism (discourse theory), thereby adding to the growing number of studies about the link between populism and conspiracy stories while offering a way to use discourse theory in the study of modern political communication in the Tunisian situation.
Thus, the questions that this study deals with are the following: What are the functions of conspiracy theory rhetoric used by the populist leader Kais Saied? Did Saied succeed in giving sense to the empty signifiers associated with the concept of conspiracy and linking them to a nodal point revolving around collective identity? What are the determinants of similarity and difference that Saied’s conspiracy discourse has formulated to construct the discursive identity of the other/conspirators? How did Saied’s conspiracy discourse employ emotions to motivate feelings of hostility and resentment?
Conspiracy Theories as a Populist’s Political Communication Strategy
Conspiracy is always defined as a secret, illegal, and immoral collective act planned by an evil group to commit a criminal act (Douglas & Sutton, 2019). Hence, social psychologists have classified the patterns of thinking that rely on conspiracy as a logic for explaining facts and events and their problems under the name "conspiracy theory." Lee Basham (2016) considered that "any explanation of events that includes conspiracy as a salient cause” is a conspiracy theory. Conspiracy theories are a form of “information disorder” (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017: 20), specifically classified as malinformation: information that is based on reality but deliberately used to cause harm. As a point of view of the world, conspiracy theory obscures the real causes and replaces them with a set of false beliefs and assumptions based on the existence of a plotting party... Political messages based on conspiratorial beliefs work as a mechanism to confirm the assumptions that are already latent (Goreis & Kothgassner, 2020: 36–39).
Conspiracy theories find their way into the world of politics when information is absent or when there are a lot of contradictory data and information or rumors about a topic. In both cases, and especially in times of crisis, the use of conspiracy theories can actually make supporters engage in conspiratorial behavior. Many researchers confirm that conspiracy narratives often flourish during crises and have been intertwined with rumors and people's beliefs. Researchers have also shown how conspiracy theories adjust to the specific political moments they address (Koper, 2023). Sutton & Douglas (2014: 254) believe that conspiracy theorizing is a strategy that aims to change the public's information environment and shape specific paths of interpretation by destroying the credibility of all sources of this information and linking different events that occurred at different times and places and involved multiple actors. In this sense, “to believe in a conspiracy theory is to believe that the authorities can be malicious, that they can cover up their misdeeds and that official explanations for major events can be lies.”
The distinction between an evil group and a good one is the convergence point between the concept of conspiracy theories and the concept of political populism. Both are communication strategies that rely on Manichean classification as a tool to legitimize the self and delegitimize opponents. From this standpoint, the populist political actor needs conspiracy narratives as a mechanism to mobilize his supporters against those he considers his enemies by activating the conspiracy beliefs in which they trust. Thus, conspiracy becomes a stigmatizing mechanism that classifies the opponents of this political actor as traitors and oppressors who care only about their interests. Oliver and Rahn (2016) note that the belief in a conflict between elites and ordinary citizens is strongly associated with conspiratorial thinking. They confirm that “conspiracy theories seem to function as a form of populist discourse” (Stecula & Pickup, 2021).
Eirikur Bergmann (2024: 217) argues that “in contemporary post-truth politics, employing conspiracy theories is among the most potent rhetorical tools available to populist leaders.” He identifies a threefold claim that nativist populists put forth in their support of the people via conspiracy theories: creating an external threat to the nation discursively, accusing the domestic elite of betraying the people, and positioning themselves as the true defenders of the ‘pure people’ they vow to protect against both the elite and these malignant outsiders, that is, against those they have discursively created.
Sawyer & Kalayci (2022: 12) affirm that “conspiratorial beliefs are one way in which populists may counter the ‘regime of truth’” by creating “permanent skepticism and questioning” and, also, by “the constant search for hidden clues” (Madisson & Ventsel, 2020) in order to delegitimize political opponents. As such, conspiracy can offer a particular representation and interpretation of reality, leaning on a highly emotional differentiation of identities. We thus conclude that conspiracy narratives belong to “the rhetoric of emotions” (Aristotle, 1989). Ultimately, relying on conspiracy theories can be an attractive tool of mobilization, a successful tactic, and a powerful framing for populists in power that enables them to “rally the base and mainstream the fringe” (Sawyer, 2022) at the same time.
The Discursive Construction of the Other in Political Communication: Laclau and Mouffe’s Perspective
According to Alshamlan (2020: 166), the concept of the discursive construction of meaning emerges from a rejection of the idea that the meanings of things are generated inside them, independently of the contexts and interpretations that shape them. This concept is the essence of constructivist approaches, based on the distinction between physical reality and social reality. The connection between political practice and discursive practice makes truth, in politics, subject to the logic of hegemony. Therefore, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001 [1985]) see hegemony as a product of discourse and discourse as what shapes objectivity and, to some extent, truth. Hegemonic discursive practices work to gain influence over the common sense that represents the masses' concept of reality or objectivity, since the use of the common sense of the masses makes them more receptive to truth. Understanding this discourse theory requires an explanation of its key fundamental concepts. From this perspective, we will identify a pair of concepts that we will use in the next section to analyze Saied’s discourses: empty signifiers, floating signifiers, the logic of difference, and the logic of equivalence.
In their post-Marxist approach to hegemony and discourse, Laclau and Mouffe (2001 [1985]) show that "every formulation of power relations comes on the basis of excluding other possible formulations" (York, 2018). When a discourse excludes one of its elements, it defines itself through disagreement with it, because the elements of a discourse are only defined through the game of disagreement among them. Based on the approach of both Laclau and Mouffe in political analysis, which focuses on the discursive production of identity, politics can be reduced to the process of the discursive construction of the other (the political opponent) and the production of new meanings and identities by modifying existing data to make them identical with the collective identity. The formation of these identities is a political practice that has a discursive nature. Political identities "acquire relational connotations, which makes them in principle open to multiple formulations. There is no signifier or political identity that is closed to a fixed and stable meaning in a final manner" (Alshamlan, 2020: 172).
Empty Signifiers / Floating Signifier
These discursive identities are defined by nodal points that link different elements to form an integrated semantic combination. The empty signifiers will be transformed into moments that constitute the discourse of a particular political party. These empty signifiers carry different meanings from what the same signifiers might refer to in the discourse of the competing political party.
Beyond the scope of discourse, the empty signifier does not define specific significations related to a single political identity. If we consider democracy, freedom, justice, and national interest to be facts, then these facts remain mere empty signifiers unless they are linked to a central point that dresses them in the guise of identity and makes them compatible with the demands and expectations of the group.
In this theory, they are in the form of floating signifiers that different discourses try to make sense of. A floating signifier is a signifier whose signified is floating (non-fixed). In other words, there are multiple referents and different political groups that compete to assign their desired signified. Based on its own syntactic structure, every discourse highlights a signified consistent with this syntactic system and overrides other signified (Dabirimehr & Fatmi, 2014).
The Logic of Difference and the Logic of Equivalence
According to Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 45–127), politics revolves around collective identities. A collective identity is not established without hostility toward another collective identity that it classifies as its opponent. This classification of competing identities is based on antagonistic frontiers, which are formulated through the logic of equivalence and difference.
The logic of difference refers to the disparities and variations among social forces; it seeks to focus on these differences and diversities, thereby deconstructing the distinctions that exist within the social field. In this context, antagonism and otherness emerge quite clearly. The "logic of equivalence," by contrast, aims to simplify the political space; discourses constantly attempt to obscure existing variations in order to create a homogeneous society, a process achieved through the construction of a "chain of equivalence." This chain demonstrates that, within the process of "discursive articulation," certain signifiers are integrated with others into a syntagmatic sequence, positioned in opposition to an "other" that is perceived as a threat (Dabirimehr & Fatmi, 2014).
The logic of equivalence stands on the symbolic unification of a series of demands, "which represent the raw material of collective identity," within a dominant collective demand by feeding the feeling of unity and solidarity. As for the logic of difference, it depends on the exclusion of an opposing outcast element that prevents the achievement of what the group aspires to by feeding feelings of hostility.
These two processes of equivalence and difference “are simply in a zero-sum relation of exclusion of each other” (Laclau, 2005: 78) and will produce “a logic of hegemony,” which means, for Laclau and Mouffe, the ability of a particular social force to represent the entire overall system.
Methods
Based on Laclau and Mouffe's discourse-theoretical approach to populism, which we explained above, we will take the rhetoric of the populist leader, Tunisian President Kais Saied, as the primary unit of analysis. For the purposes of this study, the source material for the president's speeches was obtained from the official website of the presidency and from its official Facebook page. Using this official presidential account provides direct evidence from the primary source regarding his political engagement.
The gathered speeches cover the period from the so-called July 25 coup[1] to the 2024 presidential election campaign[2] in order to capture a wide range of contexts in which Saied might use conspiratorial rhetoric. The inclusion of speeches from various dates also allows researchers and readers to assess whether the narratives change over time. In total, approximately 20 of these speeches or appearances were selected (see Appendix). The criterion for selection of our sample was that it should include mentions of conspiracies, and the criterion for exclusion was that the speeches did not explicitly mention conspiracies. After examining these twenty speeches, we extracted the six conspiratorial narratives that were frequently repeated in these speeches, as shown in Table 1.

Attempting to examine these narratives, we are going to focus on the mechanisms of constructing the identity of the other/conspirators from three aspects: signifying practices, definitional frontiers, and the employment of passions. In the first phase, we will define the empty and floating codes in Saied’s conspiracy discourse, given that the “code” is the central unit of analysis in the discourse approach adopted by Laclau and Mouffe. We are then going to map the “chains of equivalence” that connect these signifiers to each other to understand how these signifiers construct a chain of equivalence that dissolves distinct political differences into a single hostile camp.
In the second stage, we focus on the rhetorical construction of antagonistic definitional frontiers between “them” and “us” in order to demonstrate the process of identification through which Saied shaped both collective and excluded identities. To understand the antagonistic definitional frontiers between “they” and “we,” it is important to extract their characteristics, roles, identities, and objectives as identified by Saied in his speeches.
In the third stage, we concentrate on Saied’s exploitation of passions in community building and the exclusion of otherness, in view of the centrality of passions to Laclau and Mouffe’s theory. We will identify the emotional statements and sentences in which the pronouns “they” and “we” occur together and then determine the emotional world these statements depict and the myths on which they are based.
Results and Discussion
The political use of conspiracy theories as “populist counter-narratives” (Butter, 2023) by President Kais Saied, who has been classified as a populist leader since his success in the 2019 presidential elections, is a communication ploy to encircle the stifling political and economic crisis. Saied's conspiracy narrative represents a logic of simplification of political spaces. It plays on ambiguity, floating signifiers, and nationalist biases to create a common enemy and to make it the scapegoat responsible for the crisis. Therefore, these narratives are polarizing, divisive, and thus antagonistic.
The “Conspirators” as Empty Signifier
In all of his speeches in which he spoke about conspirators, Saied frequently referred to “them” using terms such as “some parties,” “certain entities,” “certain actors,” “a number of people,” and “those”… Saied always talks about "dark rooms" (the most commonly used term) or “operations rooms” (July 22, 2024) and indicates “suspicious movements” and “rabid anti-state campaigns” (November 7, 2022). He also alludes to the existence of "networks inside the country that are linked to networks abroad" (May 6, 2024) or “people in Western cities and embassies plotting against Tunisia.”
So “conspirators” is an empty signifier (i.e., a signifier without a signified), a meaningless function in Saied's discourse, which makes it an ambiguous concept that cannot be explored. We know these conspirators through their negative qualities and intentions, but who they are and how they achieve these intentions remain unknown to us. Despite the many rhetorical occasions on which Saied talks about conspirators, he fails to transform the conspirators into a specific signifier associated with Saied's political project that makes it different from what it is as a shameful act in other discourses. The systems of signification scattered throughout his discourses about conspirators seem unable to give us access to who these conspirators are.
The conspirators, as an empty signifier in Saied's discourse, were emptied of their content and slipped under the signified. Thus, conspiracy and conspirators became “a signifier so over-coded that it means everything and nothing” (Torfing, 1999: 301). It seems as if Saied disengaged this empty signifier from its previous connotations in order to create an empty space that can be filled with new meanings on every discursive occasion. In fact, the conspirators are, on the one hand, the collaborators and traitors who conspire against the security of the state, and are, on the other hand, those who monopolize goods and speculate on prices, or those who create crises and inflame social conditions, or criminal lobbies and networks that conduct rabid campaigns against the state, and they are also all the corrupt and corrupters.
In this sense, conspirators is a malleable construct that gives the populist leader a justification to identify with his people and establishes a closed collective identity. From this point of view, conspiracy in Saied’s discourse becomes “an expression without clear definition but with strong normative charging” that plays an important role in “Uniting diverse populations under a common banner and endowing political demands with self-evident legitimacy, they constitute a potent tool for rallying support for political action” (Pasitselska & Baden, 2020: 666).
While the excluded identity is based on the signification of conspiracy and conspirators, the collective identity was built on a nodal point revolving around the frequently recurring idea of “the national liberation war” that the president is waging with his people against these conspirators. This nodal point is associated with floating signifiers: nation, national sovereignty, national security, and revolution. Thus, in Saied's discourse, the empty and floating signifiers converge to create a powerful political equation: Political Opposition = enemies of the state vs. the Pure People (represented by the President).
As illustrated in Figure 1, the logic of equivalence predominant in Saied’s narratives leads to a dichotomization of political space, a social division into two opposing camps: conspiratorial agents vs. loyal patriots. In consequence, the conspirators, whom Saied presents as political opponents, play a dual role in shaping the discourse. On the one hand, they are represented as a threat. But, on the other hand, they are a powerful catalyst for political mobilization and the rallying of supporters. According to Laclau and Mouffe’s vision, the existence of conspirators in an antagonistic position strengthens the position of the meaning of collective identity.

Antagonistic Definitional Frontiers: Conspiracy as a Mechanism of Exclusion
Kaçar Aşcı (2021: 221) notes that “adopting a performative political style, populist leaders or parties, especially when appealing to the ‘people,’ exclude certain social actors from the mostly vague span of ‘the people.’ Yet, they render this exclusion by including these social actors in their styles and representing these actors pejoratively.” The logic of conspiracy meets this requirement, as it is able to construct antagonism between the people and the “others” and to polarize supporters based on the principles of sameness and difference. Furthermore, it should be underlined that “the practical closure of identity requires a homogenizing and polarizing logic that renders everything interior to the system of sameness and everything exterior to it different” (McKean, 2016: 802).
The system of similarity or equivalence, in our case study, is based on fixing the meaning of the elements associated with “we” and transforming them into “moments” centered around a strong nodal point: the “national liberation war” that President Saied wants to fight with his people. These moments (nation, revolution, security, national sovereignty, peace, stability, and the will of the people) are established in a chain of equivalence, weaving relationships of difference with the “conspirators” who threaten to undermine them.
The system of difference is based on a set of elements associated with “they” that have retained their multiplicity of meanings, and President Saied has been careful to keep them as floating signifiers, that is, elements that are not fixed to a strict meaning and do not become nodal points in this populist discourse. These floating signifiers, characterizing others as (traitors, agents, lobbies, enemies of Tunisia, criminal gangs, monopolists and cartels, corrupt and corrupted), are potential nodal points whose meaning is still subject to conflict and debate in the opposing political discourses (Torfing, 1999: 98–99; Žižek, 1989). Because they are changing signifiers, different political discourses compete to fill them with different connotations.
However, it derives its meaning from establishing an equivalence with the “national liberation war” as a nodal point able to unify the discursive identity of the group (us), and the formation of this discursive identity requires drawing hostile frontiers by excluding elements that represent a threat to the president and his people. These excluded elements are a condition for establishing the legitimacy of the president's discourse and the formation of the collective identity. It thus acts as a “constitutive outside” (Torfing, 1999) that reinforces the collective identity by drawing an imagined relationship of difference.

We can conclude that Saied’s conspiracy narratives include a highly antagonistic organization of identities by creating a sharp conflict between "their" characteristics, roles, identities, and goals and “our” own, as detailed in Table 2.
We notice that the moral stigmatization of the other is the salient strategy that Saied uses throughout his narratives to create an antagonistic division of society into two camps. This moral stigmatization has two functions: Conspiratorial demonization, which is used to attack and delegitimize opponents, and Conspiratorial mobilization, which has been used to mobilize a more tangible “mass” of supporters through the formation of a collective identity.
Passions: Conspiracies as Narratives of Resentment and Construction of Otherness
Like all populist leaders, Kais Saied resorts to conspiracy narratives to mobilize supporters (Annovi, 2024). Therefore, he deals with the threatened basic needs of the Tunisian people so that he obtains psychological responses. He exploits citizens' complaints about the lack of basic commodities in the markets and accuses his opponents of “engaging in suspicious acts with smugglers and monopolists to withdraw goods from the markets or raise their prices” (January 2, 2023). In the same style, he explained the rising prices by “the existence of known entities seeking to inflame the situation and create crises in all sectors” (August 30, 2022). The same accusation was used to explain the lack of medicines and the frequent water cuts.
Thus, Saied appeals to people’s beliefs by targeting their specifics/local adaptation and by playing on fear, resentment, uncertainty, and doubt. He uses conspiracy narratives as a way to situate daily life and Tunisians’ experiences within the domain of politics. This was clearly shown in the president's adoption of conspiratorial views and beliefs posted on social media platforms. For example, while visiting a milk factory, he quoted a sarcastic conclusion that spread on Facebook about the loss of semi-fat milk. He said: “There are cows that produce whole-fat milk and zero-fat milk, but the cows that produce subsidized semi-fat milk are missing!” (December 5, 2022).
In the same way, he dealt with the sub-Saharan African migrant crisis. He benefited from the coordinated campaign led by the Tunisian Nationalist Party on social media platforms against their presence in Tunisia to announce in an official statement: “There is a criminal plan to change the composition of the demographic landscape in Tunisia and some individuals have received large sums of money to give residence to sub-Saharan migrants” (February 21, 2023). These narratives, loaded with emotion and sentiment, provide “a highly affective infrastructure” (Schopper & Wiertz, 2024), so adapted to the Tunisian political context and characterized by their passionate intensity that expresses negative feelings such as anger, disgust, suspicion, mistrust, and disillusionment.
Thus, President Saied’s conspiracy is a narrative expression of the passions, very much projected onto the local present context. It provides a useful framework that gives existing emotions a discursive form and an official nature. In addition, the structuration of affective identities using conspiracy narratives contributes to the illusion of the existence of a permanent crisis or emergency that we must work to confront. In this context, Saied is constantly trying to create a confrontational atmosphere, repeating the idea that invisible forces are plotting against him and the people in “dark rooms” and that a “war of national liberation” must be fought against them.
While this simplified and affective view seems to lack logical coherence, it has a powerful impact because it can be invoked and adapted to different contexts and can mobilize the popular belief system. Considering that appropriate myths do not need arguments or logic, the constant refuge in conspiracy enables Saied to explain the unexplainable in order to control the existing political and economic crisis.
Saied’s conspiracy narratives, which revolve around unraveling conspiracies against the state and the idea that there is one common enemy (however obscure and multiple), represent a powerful discursive frame that helps him to create an illusion. This political illusion or imaginary contributes to fueling the crisis and making it permanent. But it is a reassuring illusion that aims to produce the image of a savior president capable of encircling the crisis and confronting the conspirators. This reassuring illusion is grounded in two myths:
The myth of evil: This represents the conspiratorial other as the source of evil that creates the crisis.
The myth of the providential savior: In this myth, the president is on a divine mission to save his people from the “imminent danger” to the country.
The Table 3 illustrates some of the ideas that were repeated in Kais Saied's speeches and belong to these two myths:

We can conclude that President Saied’s conspiracy narratives are a form of hegemonic practice (in its post-structuralist sense) that links contiguous elements and creates equivalences between different meanings for political gains. These narratives lead to the formulation of a collective political identity in the context of a conflict that derives its dynamism and continuity from the creation of previously non-existent frontiers. Thus, the communicative political use of conspiracy is an aspect of creative political action that is centered on an unstable world of meanings that can be combined with other elements and form new meanings that are in line with the current context. And this allows for the critique of this context and the preservation of the state of conflict.
The use of conspiracy gives populist political actors a slippery dimension that enables them to continuously redefine their collective identity and expand the scope of their discourse and audience. The power of conspiracy in President Saied's narratives stems from its ability to produce new meanings from existing facts and from not being locked into a fixed meaning. This is what Laclau and Mouffe call “articulation,” which means “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 105).
In fact, he links the milk shortage crisis to smuggling, monopolization, and the destruction of social peace; water and electricity cuts to the targeting of his election campaign; foreign funding for organizations to the settlement of Africans; and other associations that produce floating signifiers with open-ended meanings that can be employed in every circumstance and crisis.
Conclusion and Future Directions
Our three-level analysis based on Laclau and Mouffe's approach led us to a number of conclusions centered on the importance of "conspiracy theories as a component of populist rhetoric" (Sawyer & Kalayci, 2022) in Saied’s discourse.
First, we point out that "conspiracy" is an element that has been defined in various ways within Saied’s discourse and that he has been unable to pin it down to a single, precise, and unambiguous meaning. Consequently, it has remained an "empty signifier," one whose signified content is reconstructed anew in every speech and within the context of every crisis. This articulation, combined with the instability of meaning, results in the reproduction of the conspiracy, causing it to become entrenched in the mind of the recipient. Thus, a conspiracy is a purely discursive process, regardless of whether or not it exists in reality.
In contrast, all the speeches reinforced the significance of the "national liberation war," which represented the nodal point in the conspiracy narratives. Collective identity is organized around this nodal point. To fill this nodal point with meaning, signifiers are linked together in chains of equivalence, which define what is equivalent to the values of the collective identity (nationhood, sovereignty, peace, and stability) and what stands in opposition to them.
Hence, this nodal point functions as a discursive mechanism for establishing two identities defined by a relationship of conflict and antagonistic opposition: a collective identity within which the 'self' is situated and a collective identity that is excluded.
Second, we come to the conclusion that, following this logic of equivalence, Saied grouped together all crises and demands (rising prices, shortages of essential goods, interruptions to the drinking water supply, the crisis involving sub-Saharan Africans, and the stalling of development projects) and linked them into an integrated chain directed against a single, common enemy: "them." This act of linking served to dissolve the distinctions between the various components of this "them," thereby forging a unified political front and creating a binary polarization.
Thus, the deployment of conspiracy logic is a hegemonic discursive practice that frames Saied’s political vision as the natural state of affairs, a common-sense logic that all "free" Tunisians ought to embrace. Yet, Saied’s success in imposing this hegemonic discourse hinges on his ability to sustain the stabilization of the otherwise fluid meanings surrounding the concepts of "conspiracy" and "conspirators."
Third, our analysis reveals the triple functions of populist leaders’ investment in conspiracy narratives: construction of external threats, demonization of internal elites, and presentation of themselves as protectors of the people. To achieve these functions, populists need to manipulate collective identities by providing a tangible symbol for a wide variety of inside and outside “enemies of the nation.” This further supports the idea of the ability of populism “to create and generate ‘otherness’ by distancing and even stigmatizing all the ‘different’ who do not support its discourses” (Petkova, 2024: 60). This explains how conspiracy narratives become the main suitable meaning-making mechanism for populists in power.
On the other hand, these narratives can have negative repercussions on the political system and democracy. This is because “the constant use of labels against any opposing or ‘annoying’ rhetoric creates even greater problems in political life, while the concept loses any of its usefulness and analytical value. The political discourse becomes even vaguer, helping neither politics nor society. How can the people engage in a political debate that takes place in terms that are not substantially explained? Furthermore, the devaluation of the political opponent leads the political dialogue to a deadlock, creating conditions of intense polarization that do not allow consensus over important issues that plague society” (Markou, 2022: 164).
Methodologically, the discursive approach to populism in light of Laclau and Mouffe's perspectives is a fruitful exploration that has proven its effectiveness in analyzing populist conspiracy narratives, although it is rarely used in analyzing populist discourses, especially on the topic of conspiracy rhetoric. This theoretical and analytical approach enabled us to uncover the logic of domination and hostility that surrounds Tunisian populist discourse, despite the ambiguity and complexity of some of its concepts and the difficulty of applying them, and despite accusations of reductionism and exaggeration of polarity.[3]
Although we are exploring a new horizon for analyzing populist discourse that is rooted in the post-structuralist approach and seeks to exploit its theoretical and methodological tools, we need to conduct a comparative study between President Saied's narratives and other conspiracy narratives of populists in power, such as Donald Trump, in order to be able to generalize our findings.
We also recognize that our research may have two additional limitations: we have yet to examine how digital media facilitate the spread of such emotional narratives, how these narratives have become part of mainstream discourse, and the extent to which they shape political convictions, foster a populist public opinion that embraces conspiracy theories, and generate emotion-based political identities. Furthermore, we could explore how a context of political polarization might deepen conspiracy-driven narratives, creating what could be termed a "spiral of populist conspiratorial thinking" (Busi, 2024: 124).
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(*) Chahira Ben Abdallah is an Assistant Professor and researcher in media and communication at the Institute of Press and Information Sciences, University of Manouba, Tunisia.
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Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
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Appendix
Appendix 1. Speeches and Appearances Selected for Analysis
No. | Date | Speech / Appearance | Original Link |
|---|---|---|---|
1 | 25/07/2021 | The president of the republic chairs an emergency meeting of military and security leaders | |
2 | 01/08/2021 | The President of the Republic, Kais Saied, conducts an inspection tour of Habib Bourguiba Avenue in capital city Tunis | |
3 | 20/09/2021 | President Kais Saied's Speech from Sidi Bouzid | |
4 | 04/10/2021 | President Kais Saied Receives Mr. Youssef Bouzakher, President of the Supreme Judicial Council | |
5 | 28/03/2022 | President Kais Saied chairs the national Security Council meeting | |
6 | 09/05/2022 | Meeting of the president Kais Saied with Mr. Tawfiq Sharfeddin, Minister of the Interior | |
7 | 30/08/2022 | Communiqué on the excessive rise of prices and illegal speculation in many commodities | |
8 | 07/11/2022 | Meeting of the President of the Republic, Kais Saied, with the Minister of the Interior | |
9 | 05/12/2022 | A visit of the President of the Republic, Kais Saied, to the milk factory in the industrial zone of Sulaiman, in the governorate of Nabeul | |
10 | 19/12/2022 | Statement on the questioning of election results | |
11 | 28/12/2022 | The President of the Republic chairs a meeting with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of National Defense, the Minister of the Interior, and military and security leaders. | |
12 | 02/01/2023 | Meeting between President Kais Saied and the President of the Tunisian Union of Industry, Commerce, and Traditional Crafts. | |
13 | 21/02/2023 | The National Security Council meeting was devoted to urgent measures that must be adopted to deal with the influx of large numbers of irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa into Tunisia | |
14 | 08/03/2023 | The President of the Republic, Kais Saied, supervises the Council of Ministers meeting | |
15 | 08/05/2023 | Meeting of President Kais Saied with Ms. Leila Jaffal, Minister of Justice | |
16 | 10/06/2023 | President Kais Saied visits the governorate of Sfax | |
17 | 06/05/2024 | Speech by President Kais Saied at the Opening of the National Security Council Meeting | |
18 | 05/07/2024 | A meeting with the Minister of the Interior and the Secretary of State to the Minister of the Interior in charge of National Security to discuss the overall security situation in the country | |
19 | 22/07/2024 | The President of the Republic inspects a number of dams and investigates the causes of the disruption in the supply of drinking and irrigation water in the governorates of Jendouba, Kairouan, Monastir, and the region of Grambalia | |
20 | 25/07/2024 | The President of the Republic’s speech to the Tunisian people on the occasion of the celebration of the anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic. |
Footnotes
[1] On July 25, 2021, President Saied declared a state of emergency, based on Article 80 of the constitution, and decided to dismiss the prime minister, assume executive power himself, and suspend parliament indefinitely. Critics branded the move as a coup. Since then, Saied has assumed all powers, in an increasingly gloomy economic and social climate threatened by the continued influx of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and asylum seekers, amid tensions with the local population and police repression.
[2] These elections, in which Kais Saied won a second term, took place on October 6, 2024, in a tense political climate marked by restrictions on freedoms, an alarming decline in democracy, and a stifling economic and social crisis.
[3] Among the most prominent criticisms directed at Laclau and Mouffe's theory are:
· Marxists and realists criticize this theoretical trend for exaggerating the discursive nature of social space, thereby marginalizing economic and material structural factors.
· Some researchers have described their ideas as “incomplete discursive structures,” which makes them difficult to apply in practice. Furthermore, these ideas raise the issue of a return to structuralism, despite their claims of post-structuralism.
· One example is the concept of hostile frontiers between us and them and Mouffe's view that political identity is inherently hostile. This has been criticized for potentially legitimizing exclusionary and nationalist policies, a concern that was exacerbated by her subsequent willingness to engage with left-wing populist movements that sometimes resort to nationalist rhetoric.
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Conspiracy Narratives and the Discursive Identity of ‘the Other’ in Tunisian Political Populism
Chahira Ben Abdallah
Introduction
In the last decade, the return to conspiracy theory has coincided with nationalist and identity reversals driven by racism and hate. At the same time, there has been a steady increase in the diffusion of conspiracy theories in political communication. Consequently, there has been a surge in the number of studies tackling the use of conspiracy theories by political actors as a communication strategy. These studies have highlighted the fact that beliefs in conspiracy theories are very often associated with populism (Van Prooijen, 2018; Oliver & Rahn, 2016; Merkley, 2020). In fact, the hypothesis of an “elective affinity” between populism and conspiratorial ideas is old and can be traced back to the American literature on populism in the mid-1950s (Ivaldi, 2021). However, the adoption of conspiracy theories by populists in the twenty-first century is attributed to Donald Trump's populism in the United States, which has relied heavily on conspiratorial ideas and the dissemination of fake news.
Conspiracy theories, such as those surrounding the origin of the COVID-19 virus and vaccines, as well as those related to immigration, such as the “Great Replacement” theory, have become an integral part of the ideological framework of both right-wing populist and non-populist politicians. In Italy, conspiracy theories were at the heart of the populist campaigns of the Lega as well as the M5S (Maccaferri, 2022). In France, Marine Le Pen's party did not hesitate, during the coronavirus pandemic, to denounce the "incompetence" and "lies" of the executive authority. Likewise, in Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro's management of the COVID-19 epidemic was very strongly marked by "scientific denialism" (Kaltwasser & Taggart, 2022).
These examples show the growing political relevance of conspiracy theories and the close connection between populism and conspiracy beliefs, “especially due to their common dichotomic nature” (Markou, 2022: 161) and “Manichean and antagonistic societal outlook” (Hameleers, 2020: 107). On that basis, our research aims to focus on the Tunisian political context in order to study “the specific case of the presidency of Kais Saied in Tunisia, which has been labelled as a form of constitutional populism integrating conspiracy theories” (Annovi, 2024: 43). We estimate that the conspiracy logic that Kais Saied frequently adopts is strategically exploited as a kind of “alternative reality” and a defense mechanism that he resorts to for strategic and pragmatic reasons.
Our analysis is based on the theory and methodological tools of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis, which examines populism as a reason/logic and considers the political opponent (other) as a central element in the analysis because it acquires a formative character in the formation of political discourse. We will rely on the key theoretical components of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of populism: antagonism, chain of equivalence, empty signifier, and the role of passions. This discursive approach, with the aim of showing the performative power and the persuasive appeal of conspiracy narratives in Kais Saied’s political communication, enables us to understand his “conspiracy rhetoric” (Goldzwig, 2002) or “conspiratorial imagination” (Jasmin, 2009).
Despite growing academic interest in the relationship between populism and conspiracy theories, and even though some studies have touched upon "conspiratorial populism" in the case of Kais Saied (Annovi, 2024; Kahlaoui, 2024; Sayfo & Kmeczko, 2026), there are, to the best of my knowledge, no studies that have examined Kais Saied’s discourse from the perspective of Laclau and Mouffe’s method. Thus, this study wants to fill this gap by using this well-known method to look at populism (discourse theory), thereby adding to the growing number of studies about the link between populism and conspiracy stories while offering a way to use discourse theory in the study of modern political communication in the Tunisian situation.
Thus, the questions that this study deals with are the following: What are the functions of conspiracy theory rhetoric used by the populist leader Kais Saied? Did Saied succeed in giving sense to the empty signifiers associated with the concept of conspiracy and linking them to a nodal point revolving around collective identity? What are the determinants of similarity and difference that Saied’s conspiracy discourse has formulated to construct the discursive identity of the other/conspirators? How did Saied’s conspiracy discourse employ emotions to motivate feelings of hostility and resentment?
Conspiracy Theories as a Populist’s Political Communication Strategy
Conspiracy is always defined as a secret, illegal, and immoral collective act planned by an evil group to commit a criminal act (Douglas & Sutton, 2019). Hence, social psychologists have classified the patterns of thinking that rely on conspiracy as a logic for explaining facts and events and their problems under the name "conspiracy theory." Lee Basham (2016) considered that "any explanation of events that includes conspiracy as a salient cause” is a conspiracy theory. Conspiracy theories are a form of “information disorder” (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017: 20), specifically classified as malinformation: information that is based on reality but deliberately used to cause harm. As a point of view of the world, conspiracy theory obscures the real causes and replaces them with a set of false beliefs and assumptions based on the existence of a plotting party... Political messages based on conspiratorial beliefs work as a mechanism to confirm the assumptions that are already latent (Goreis & Kothgassner, 2020: 36–39).
Conspiracy theories find their way into the world of politics when information is absent or when there are a lot of contradictory data and information or rumors about a topic. In both cases, and especially in times of crisis, the use of conspiracy theories can actually make supporters engage in conspiratorial behavior. Many researchers confirm that conspiracy narratives often flourish during crises and have been intertwined with rumors and people's beliefs. Researchers have also shown how conspiracy theories adjust to the specific political moments they address (Koper, 2023). Sutton & Douglas (2014: 254) believe that conspiracy theorizing is a strategy that aims to change the public's information environment and shape specific paths of interpretation by destroying the credibility of all sources of this information and linking different events that occurred at different times and places and involved multiple actors. In this sense, “to believe in a conspiracy theory is to believe that the authorities can be malicious, that they can cover up their misdeeds and that official explanations for major events can be lies.”
The distinction between an evil group and a good one is the convergence point between the concept of conspiracy theories and the concept of political populism. Both are communication strategies that rely on Manichean classification as a tool to legitimize the self and delegitimize opponents. From this standpoint, the populist political actor needs conspiracy narratives as a mechanism to mobilize his supporters against those he considers his enemies by activating the conspiracy beliefs in which they trust. Thus, conspiracy becomes a stigmatizing mechanism that classifies the opponents of this political actor as traitors and oppressors who care only about their interests. Oliver and Rahn (2016) note that the belief in a conflict between elites and ordinary citizens is strongly associated with conspiratorial thinking. They confirm that “conspiracy theories seem to function as a form of populist discourse” (Stecula & Pickup, 2021).
Eirikur Bergmann (2024: 217) argues that “in contemporary post-truth politics, employing conspiracy theories is among the most potent rhetorical tools available to populist leaders.” He identifies a threefold claim that nativist populists put forth in their support of the people via conspiracy theories: creating an external threat to the nation discursively, accusing the domestic elite of betraying the people, and positioning themselves as the true defenders of the ‘pure people’ they vow to protect against both the elite and these malignant outsiders, that is, against those they have discursively created.
Sawyer & Kalayci (2022: 12) affirm that “conspiratorial beliefs are one way in which populists may counter the ‘regime of truth’” by creating “permanent skepticism and questioning” and, also, by “the constant search for hidden clues” (Madisson & Ventsel, 2020) in order to delegitimize political opponents. As such, conspiracy can offer a particular representation and interpretation of reality, leaning on a highly emotional differentiation of identities. We thus conclude that conspiracy narratives belong to “the rhetoric of emotions” (Aristotle, 1989). Ultimately, relying on conspiracy theories can be an attractive tool of mobilization, a successful tactic, and a powerful framing for populists in power that enables them to “rally the base and mainstream the fringe” (Sawyer, 2022) at the same time.
The Discursive Construction of the Other in Political Communication: Laclau and Mouffe’s Perspective
According to Alshamlan (2020: 166), the concept of the discursive construction of meaning emerges from a rejection of the idea that the meanings of things are generated inside them, independently of the contexts and interpretations that shape them. This concept is the essence of constructivist approaches, based on the distinction between physical reality and social reality. The connection between political practice and discursive practice makes truth, in politics, subject to the logic of hegemony. Therefore, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001 [1985]) see hegemony as a product of discourse and discourse as what shapes objectivity and, to some extent, truth. Hegemonic discursive practices work to gain influence over the common sense that represents the masses' concept of reality or objectivity, since the use of the common sense of the masses makes them more receptive to truth. Understanding this discourse theory requires an explanation of its key fundamental concepts. From this perspective, we will identify a pair of concepts that we will use in the next section to analyze Saied’s discourses: empty signifiers, floating signifiers, the logic of difference, and the logic of equivalence.
In their post-Marxist approach to hegemony and discourse, Laclau and Mouffe (2001 [1985]) show that "every formulation of power relations comes on the basis of excluding other possible formulations" (York, 2018). When a discourse excludes one of its elements, it defines itself through disagreement with it, because the elements of a discourse are only defined through the game of disagreement among them. Based on the approach of both Laclau and Mouffe in political analysis, which focuses on the discursive production of identity, politics can be reduced to the process of the discursive construction of the other (the political opponent) and the production of new meanings and identities by modifying existing data to make them identical with the collective identity. The formation of these identities is a political practice that has a discursive nature. Political identities "acquire relational connotations, which makes them in principle open to multiple formulations. There is no signifier or political identity that is closed to a fixed and stable meaning in a final manner" (Alshamlan, 2020: 172).
Empty Signifiers / Floating Signifier
These discursive identities are defined by nodal points that link different elements to form an integrated semantic combination. The empty signifiers will be transformed into moments that constitute the discourse of a particular political party. These empty signifiers carry different meanings from what the same signifiers might refer to in the discourse of the competing political party.
Beyond the scope of discourse, the empty signifier does not define specific significations related to a single political identity. If we consider democracy, freedom, justice, and national interest to be facts, then these facts remain mere empty signifiers unless they are linked to a central point that dresses them in the guise of identity and makes them compatible with the demands and expectations of the group.
In this theory, they are in the form of floating signifiers that different discourses try to make sense of. A floating signifier is a signifier whose signified is floating (non-fixed). In other words, there are multiple referents and different political groups that compete to assign their desired signified. Based on its own syntactic structure, every discourse highlights a signified consistent with this syntactic system and overrides other signified (Dabirimehr & Fatmi, 2014).
The Logic of Difference and the Logic of Equivalence
According to Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 45–127), politics revolves around collective identities. A collective identity is not established without hostility toward another collective identity that it classifies as its opponent. This classification of competing identities is based on antagonistic frontiers, which are formulated through the logic of equivalence and difference.
The logic of difference refers to the disparities and variations among social forces; it seeks to focus on these differences and diversities, thereby deconstructing the distinctions that exist within the social field. In this context, antagonism and otherness emerge quite clearly. The "logic of equivalence," by contrast, aims to simplify the political space; discourses constantly attempt to obscure existing variations in order to create a homogeneous society, a process achieved through the construction of a "chain of equivalence." This chain demonstrates that, within the process of "discursive articulation," certain signifiers are integrated with others into a syntagmatic sequence, positioned in opposition to an "other" that is perceived as a threat (Dabirimehr & Fatmi, 2014).
The logic of equivalence stands on the symbolic unification of a series of demands, "which represent the raw material of collective identity," within a dominant collective demand by feeding the feeling of unity and solidarity. As for the logic of difference, it depends on the exclusion of an opposing outcast element that prevents the achievement of what the group aspires to by feeding feelings of hostility.
These two processes of equivalence and difference “are simply in a zero-sum relation of exclusion of each other” (Laclau, 2005: 78) and will produce “a logic of hegemony,” which means, for Laclau and Mouffe, the ability of a particular social force to represent the entire overall system.
Methods
Based on Laclau and Mouffe's discourse-theoretical approach to populism, which we explained above, we will take the rhetoric of the populist leader, Tunisian President Kais Saied, as the primary unit of analysis. For the purposes of this study, the source material for the president's speeches was obtained from the official website of the presidency and from its official Facebook page. Using this official presidential account provides direct evidence from the primary source regarding his political engagement.
The gathered speeches cover the period from the so-called July 25 coup[1] to the 2024 presidential election campaign[2] in order to capture a wide range of contexts in which Saied might use conspiratorial rhetoric. The inclusion of speeches from various dates also allows researchers and readers to assess whether the narratives change over time. In total, approximately 20 of these speeches or appearances were selected (see Appendix). The criterion for selection of our sample was that it should include mentions of conspiracies, and the criterion for exclusion was that the speeches did not explicitly mention conspiracies. After examining these twenty speeches, we extracted the six conspiratorial narratives that were frequently repeated in these speeches, as shown in Table 1.

Attempting to examine these narratives, we are going to focus on the mechanisms of constructing the identity of the other/conspirators from three aspects: signifying practices, definitional frontiers, and the employment of passions. In the first phase, we will define the empty and floating codes in Saied’s conspiracy discourse, given that the “code” is the central unit of analysis in the discourse approach adopted by Laclau and Mouffe. We are then going to map the “chains of equivalence” that connect these signifiers to each other to understand how these signifiers construct a chain of equivalence that dissolves distinct political differences into a single hostile camp.
In the second stage, we focus on the rhetorical construction of antagonistic definitional frontiers between “them” and “us” in order to demonstrate the process of identification through which Saied shaped both collective and excluded identities. To understand the antagonistic definitional frontiers between “they” and “we,” it is important to extract their characteristics, roles, identities, and objectives as identified by Saied in his speeches.
In the third stage, we concentrate on Saied’s exploitation of passions in community building and the exclusion of otherness, in view of the centrality of passions to Laclau and Mouffe’s theory. We will identify the emotional statements and sentences in which the pronouns “they” and “we” occur together and then determine the emotional world these statements depict and the myths on which they are based.
Results and Discussion
The political use of conspiracy theories as “populist counter-narratives” (Butter, 2023) by President Kais Saied, who has been classified as a populist leader since his success in the 2019 presidential elections, is a communication ploy to encircle the stifling political and economic crisis. Saied's conspiracy narrative represents a logic of simplification of political spaces. It plays on ambiguity, floating signifiers, and nationalist biases to create a common enemy and to make it the scapegoat responsible for the crisis. Therefore, these narratives are polarizing, divisive, and thus antagonistic.
The “Conspirators” as Empty Signifier
In all of his speeches in which he spoke about conspirators, Saied frequently referred to “them” using terms such as “some parties,” “certain entities,” “certain actors,” “a number of people,” and “those”… Saied always talks about "dark rooms" (the most commonly used term) or “operations rooms” (July 22, 2024) and indicates “suspicious movements” and “rabid anti-state campaigns” (November 7, 2022). He also alludes to the existence of "networks inside the country that are linked to networks abroad" (May 6, 2024) or “people in Western cities and embassies plotting against Tunisia.”
So “conspirators” is an empty signifier (i.e., a signifier without a signified), a meaningless function in Saied's discourse, which makes it an ambiguous concept that cannot be explored. We know these conspirators through their negative qualities and intentions, but who they are and how they achieve these intentions remain unknown to us. Despite the many rhetorical occasions on which Saied talks about conspirators, he fails to transform the conspirators into a specific signifier associated with Saied's political project that makes it different from what it is as a shameful act in other discourses. The systems of signification scattered throughout his discourses about conspirators seem unable to give us access to who these conspirators are.
The conspirators, as an empty signifier in Saied's discourse, were emptied of their content and slipped under the signified. Thus, conspiracy and conspirators became “a signifier so over-coded that it means everything and nothing” (Torfing, 1999: 301). It seems as if Saied disengaged this empty signifier from its previous connotations in order to create an empty space that can be filled with new meanings on every discursive occasion. In fact, the conspirators are, on the one hand, the collaborators and traitors who conspire against the security of the state, and are, on the other hand, those who monopolize goods and speculate on prices, or those who create crises and inflame social conditions, or criminal lobbies and networks that conduct rabid campaigns against the state, and they are also all the corrupt and corrupters.
In this sense, conspirators is a malleable construct that gives the populist leader a justification to identify with his people and establishes a closed collective identity. From this point of view, conspiracy in Saied’s discourse becomes “an expression without clear definition but with strong normative charging” that plays an important role in “Uniting diverse populations under a common banner and endowing political demands with self-evident legitimacy, they constitute a potent tool for rallying support for political action” (Pasitselska & Baden, 2020: 666).
While the excluded identity is based on the signification of conspiracy and conspirators, the collective identity was built on a nodal point revolving around the frequently recurring idea of “the national liberation war” that the president is waging with his people against these conspirators. This nodal point is associated with floating signifiers: nation, national sovereignty, national security, and revolution. Thus, in Saied's discourse, the empty and floating signifiers converge to create a powerful political equation: Political Opposition = enemies of the state vs. the Pure People (represented by the President).
As illustrated in Figure 1, the logic of equivalence predominant in Saied’s narratives leads to a dichotomization of political space, a social division into two opposing camps: conspiratorial agents vs. loyal patriots. In consequence, the conspirators, whom Saied presents as political opponents, play a dual role in shaping the discourse. On the one hand, they are represented as a threat. But, on the other hand, they are a powerful catalyst for political mobilization and the rallying of supporters. According to Laclau and Mouffe’s vision, the existence of conspirators in an antagonistic position strengthens the position of the meaning of collective identity.

Antagonistic Definitional Frontiers: Conspiracy as a Mechanism of Exclusion
Kaçar Aşcı (2021: 221) notes that “adopting a performative political style, populist leaders or parties, especially when appealing to the ‘people,’ exclude certain social actors from the mostly vague span of ‘the people.’ Yet, they render this exclusion by including these social actors in their styles and representing these actors pejoratively.” The logic of conspiracy meets this requirement, as it is able to construct antagonism between the people and the “others” and to polarize supporters based on the principles of sameness and difference. Furthermore, it should be underlined that “the practical closure of identity requires a homogenizing and polarizing logic that renders everything interior to the system of sameness and everything exterior to it different” (McKean, 2016: 802).
The system of similarity or equivalence, in our case study, is based on fixing the meaning of the elements associated with “we” and transforming them into “moments” centered around a strong nodal point: the “national liberation war” that President Saied wants to fight with his people. These moments (nation, revolution, security, national sovereignty, peace, stability, and the will of the people) are established in a chain of equivalence, weaving relationships of difference with the “conspirators” who threaten to undermine them.
The system of difference is based on a set of elements associated with “they” that have retained their multiplicity of meanings, and President Saied has been careful to keep them as floating signifiers, that is, elements that are not fixed to a strict meaning and do not become nodal points in this populist discourse. These floating signifiers, characterizing others as (traitors, agents, lobbies, enemies of Tunisia, criminal gangs, monopolists and cartels, corrupt and corrupted), are potential nodal points whose meaning is still subject to conflict and debate in the opposing political discourses (Torfing, 1999: 98–99; Žižek, 1989). Because they are changing signifiers, different political discourses compete to fill them with different connotations.
However, it derives its meaning from establishing an equivalence with the “national liberation war” as a nodal point able to unify the discursive identity of the group (us), and the formation of this discursive identity requires drawing hostile frontiers by excluding elements that represent a threat to the president and his people. These excluded elements are a condition for establishing the legitimacy of the president's discourse and the formation of the collective identity. It thus acts as a “constitutive outside” (Torfing, 1999) that reinforces the collective identity by drawing an imagined relationship of difference.

We can conclude that Saied’s conspiracy narratives include a highly antagonistic organization of identities by creating a sharp conflict between "their" characteristics, roles, identities, and goals and “our” own, as detailed in Table 2.
We notice that the moral stigmatization of the other is the salient strategy that Saied uses throughout his narratives to create an antagonistic division of society into two camps. This moral stigmatization has two functions: Conspiratorial demonization, which is used to attack and delegitimize opponents, and Conspiratorial mobilization, which has been used to mobilize a more tangible “mass” of supporters through the formation of a collective identity.
Passions: Conspiracies as Narratives of Resentment and Construction of Otherness
Like all populist leaders, Kais Saied resorts to conspiracy narratives to mobilize supporters (Annovi, 2024). Therefore, he deals with the threatened basic needs of the Tunisian people so that he obtains psychological responses. He exploits citizens' complaints about the lack of basic commodities in the markets and accuses his opponents of “engaging in suspicious acts with smugglers and monopolists to withdraw goods from the markets or raise their prices” (January 2, 2023). In the same style, he explained the rising prices by “the existence of known entities seeking to inflame the situation and create crises in all sectors” (August 30, 2022). The same accusation was used to explain the lack of medicines and the frequent water cuts.
Thus, Saied appeals to people’s beliefs by targeting their specifics/local adaptation and by playing on fear, resentment, uncertainty, and doubt. He uses conspiracy narratives as a way to situate daily life and Tunisians’ experiences within the domain of politics. This was clearly shown in the president's adoption of conspiratorial views and beliefs posted on social media platforms. For example, while visiting a milk factory, he quoted a sarcastic conclusion that spread on Facebook about the loss of semi-fat milk. He said: “There are cows that produce whole-fat milk and zero-fat milk, but the cows that produce subsidized semi-fat milk are missing!” (December 5, 2022).
In the same way, he dealt with the sub-Saharan African migrant crisis. He benefited from the coordinated campaign led by the Tunisian Nationalist Party on social media platforms against their presence in Tunisia to announce in an official statement: “There is a criminal plan to change the composition of the demographic landscape in Tunisia and some individuals have received large sums of money to give residence to sub-Saharan migrants” (February 21, 2023). These narratives, loaded with emotion and sentiment, provide “a highly affective infrastructure” (Schopper & Wiertz, 2024), so adapted to the Tunisian political context and characterized by their passionate intensity that expresses negative feelings such as anger, disgust, suspicion, mistrust, and disillusionment.
Thus, President Saied’s conspiracy is a narrative expression of the passions, very much projected onto the local present context. It provides a useful framework that gives existing emotions a discursive form and an official nature. In addition, the structuration of affective identities using conspiracy narratives contributes to the illusion of the existence of a permanent crisis or emergency that we must work to confront. In this context, Saied is constantly trying to create a confrontational atmosphere, repeating the idea that invisible forces are plotting against him and the people in “dark rooms” and that a “war of national liberation” must be fought against them.
While this simplified and affective view seems to lack logical coherence, it has a powerful impact because it can be invoked and adapted to different contexts and can mobilize the popular belief system. Considering that appropriate myths do not need arguments or logic, the constant refuge in conspiracy enables Saied to explain the unexplainable in order to control the existing political and economic crisis.
Saied’s conspiracy narratives, which revolve around unraveling conspiracies against the state and the idea that there is one common enemy (however obscure and multiple), represent a powerful discursive frame that helps him to create an illusion. This political illusion or imaginary contributes to fueling the crisis and making it permanent. But it is a reassuring illusion that aims to produce the image of a savior president capable of encircling the crisis and confronting the conspirators. This reassuring illusion is grounded in two myths:
The myth of evil: This represents the conspiratorial other as the source of evil that creates the crisis.
The myth of the providential savior: In this myth, the president is on a divine mission to save his people from the “imminent danger” to the country.
The Table 3 illustrates some of the ideas that were repeated in Kais Saied's speeches and belong to these two myths:

We can conclude that President Saied’s conspiracy narratives are a form of hegemonic practice (in its post-structuralist sense) that links contiguous elements and creates equivalences between different meanings for political gains. These narratives lead to the formulation of a collective political identity in the context of a conflict that derives its dynamism and continuity from the creation of previously non-existent frontiers. Thus, the communicative political use of conspiracy is an aspect of creative political action that is centered on an unstable world of meanings that can be combined with other elements and form new meanings that are in line with the current context. And this allows for the critique of this context and the preservation of the state of conflict.
The use of conspiracy gives populist political actors a slippery dimension that enables them to continuously redefine their collective identity and expand the scope of their discourse and audience. The power of conspiracy in President Saied's narratives stems from its ability to produce new meanings from existing facts and from not being locked into a fixed meaning. This is what Laclau and Mouffe call “articulation,” which means “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 105).
In fact, he links the milk shortage crisis to smuggling, monopolization, and the destruction of social peace; water and electricity cuts to the targeting of his election campaign; foreign funding for organizations to the settlement of Africans; and other associations that produce floating signifiers with open-ended meanings that can be employed in every circumstance and crisis.
Conclusion and Future Directions
Our three-level analysis based on Laclau and Mouffe's approach led us to a number of conclusions centered on the importance of "conspiracy theories as a component of populist rhetoric" (Sawyer & Kalayci, 2022) in Saied’s discourse.
First, we point out that "conspiracy" is an element that has been defined in various ways within Saied’s discourse and that he has been unable to pin it down to a single, precise, and unambiguous meaning. Consequently, it has remained an "empty signifier," one whose signified content is reconstructed anew in every speech and within the context of every crisis. This articulation, combined with the instability of meaning, results in the reproduction of the conspiracy, causing it to become entrenched in the mind of the recipient. Thus, a conspiracy is a purely discursive process, regardless of whether or not it exists in reality.
In contrast, all the speeches reinforced the significance of the "national liberation war," which represented the nodal point in the conspiracy narratives. Collective identity is organized around this nodal point. To fill this nodal point with meaning, signifiers are linked together in chains of equivalence, which define what is equivalent to the values of the collective identity (nationhood, sovereignty, peace, and stability) and what stands in opposition to them.
Hence, this nodal point functions as a discursive mechanism for establishing two identities defined by a relationship of conflict and antagonistic opposition: a collective identity within which the 'self' is situated and a collective identity that is excluded.
Second, we come to the conclusion that, following this logic of equivalence, Saied grouped together all crises and demands (rising prices, shortages of essential goods, interruptions to the drinking water supply, the crisis involving sub-Saharan Africans, and the stalling of development projects) and linked them into an integrated chain directed against a single, common enemy: "them." This act of linking served to dissolve the distinctions between the various components of this "them," thereby forging a unified political front and creating a binary polarization.
Thus, the deployment of conspiracy logic is a hegemonic discursive practice that frames Saied’s political vision as the natural state of affairs, a common-sense logic that all "free" Tunisians ought to embrace. Yet, Saied’s success in imposing this hegemonic discourse hinges on his ability to sustain the stabilization of the otherwise fluid meanings surrounding the concepts of "conspiracy" and "conspirators."
Third, our analysis reveals the triple functions of populist leaders’ investment in conspiracy narratives: construction of external threats, demonization of internal elites, and presentation of themselves as protectors of the people. To achieve these functions, populists need to manipulate collective identities by providing a tangible symbol for a wide variety of inside and outside “enemies of the nation.” This further supports the idea of the ability of populism “to create and generate ‘otherness’ by distancing and even stigmatizing all the ‘different’ who do not support its discourses” (Petkova, 2024: 60). This explains how conspiracy narratives become the main suitable meaning-making mechanism for populists in power.
On the other hand, these narratives can have negative repercussions on the political system and democracy. This is because “the constant use of labels against any opposing or ‘annoying’ rhetoric creates even greater problems in political life, while the concept loses any of its usefulness and analytical value. The political discourse becomes even vaguer, helping neither politics nor society. How can the people engage in a political debate that takes place in terms that are not substantially explained? Furthermore, the devaluation of the political opponent leads the political dialogue to a deadlock, creating conditions of intense polarization that do not allow consensus over important issues that plague society” (Markou, 2022: 164).
Methodologically, the discursive approach to populism in light of Laclau and Mouffe's perspectives is a fruitful exploration that has proven its effectiveness in analyzing populist conspiracy narratives, although it is rarely used in analyzing populist discourses, especially on the topic of conspiracy rhetoric. This theoretical and analytical approach enabled us to uncover the logic of domination and hostility that surrounds Tunisian populist discourse, despite the ambiguity and complexity of some of its concepts and the difficulty of applying them, and despite accusations of reductionism and exaggeration of polarity.[3]
Although we are exploring a new horizon for analyzing populist discourse that is rooted in the post-structuralist approach and seeks to exploit its theoretical and methodological tools, we need to conduct a comparative study between President Saied's narratives and other conspiracy narratives of populists in power, such as Donald Trump, in order to be able to generalize our findings.
We also recognize that our research may have two additional limitations: we have yet to examine how digital media facilitate the spread of such emotional narratives, how these narratives have become part of mainstream discourse, and the extent to which they shape political convictions, foster a populist public opinion that embraces conspiracy theories, and generate emotion-based political identities. Furthermore, we could explore how a context of political polarization might deepen conspiracy-driven narratives, creating what could be termed a "spiral of populist conspiratorial thinking" (Busi, 2024: 124).
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(*) Chahira Ben Abdallah is an Assistant Professor and researcher in media and communication at the Institute of Press and Information Sciences, University of Manouba, Tunisia.
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Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
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Appendix
Appendix 1. Speeches and Appearances Selected for Analysis
No. | Date | Speech / Appearance | Original Link |
|---|---|---|---|
1 | 25/07/2021 | The president of the republic chairs an emergency meeting of military and security leaders | |
2 | 01/08/2021 | The President of the Republic, Kais Saied, conducts an inspection tour of Habib Bourguiba Avenue in capital city Tunis | |
3 | 20/09/2021 | President Kais Saied's Speech from Sidi Bouzid | |
4 | 04/10/2021 | President Kais Saied Receives Mr. Youssef Bouzakher, President of the Supreme Judicial Council | |
5 | 28/03/2022 | President Kais Saied chairs the national Security Council meeting | |
6 | 09/05/2022 | Meeting of the president Kais Saied with Mr. Tawfiq Sharfeddin, Minister of the Interior | |
7 | 30/08/2022 | Communiqué on the excessive rise of prices and illegal speculation in many commodities | |
8 | 07/11/2022 | Meeting of the President of the Republic, Kais Saied, with the Minister of the Interior | |
9 | 05/12/2022 | A visit of the President of the Republic, Kais Saied, to the milk factory in the industrial zone of Sulaiman, in the governorate of Nabeul | |
10 | 19/12/2022 | Statement on the questioning of election results | |
11 | 28/12/2022 | The President of the Republic chairs a meeting with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of National Defense, the Minister of the Interior, and military and security leaders. | |
12 | 02/01/2023 | Meeting between President Kais Saied and the President of the Tunisian Union of Industry, Commerce, and Traditional Crafts. | |
13 | 21/02/2023 | The National Security Council meeting was devoted to urgent measures that must be adopted to deal with the influx of large numbers of irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa into Tunisia | |
14 | 08/03/2023 | The President of the Republic, Kais Saied, supervises the Council of Ministers meeting | |
15 | 08/05/2023 | Meeting of President Kais Saied with Ms. Leila Jaffal, Minister of Justice | |
16 | 10/06/2023 | President Kais Saied visits the governorate of Sfax | |
17 | 06/05/2024 | Speech by President Kais Saied at the Opening of the National Security Council Meeting | |
18 | 05/07/2024 | A meeting with the Minister of the Interior and the Secretary of State to the Minister of the Interior in charge of National Security to discuss the overall security situation in the country | |
19 | 22/07/2024 | The President of the Republic inspects a number of dams and investigates the causes of the disruption in the supply of drinking and irrigation water in the governorates of Jendouba, Kairouan, Monastir, and the region of Grambalia | |
20 | 25/07/2024 | The President of the Republic’s speech to the Tunisian people on the occasion of the celebration of the anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic. |
Footnotes
[1] On July 25, 2021, President Saied declared a state of emergency, based on Article 80 of the constitution, and decided to dismiss the prime minister, assume executive power himself, and suspend parliament indefinitely. Critics branded the move as a coup. Since then, Saied has assumed all powers, in an increasingly gloomy economic and social climate threatened by the continued influx of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and asylum seekers, amid tensions with the local population and police repression.
[2] These elections, in which Kais Saied won a second term, took place on October 6, 2024, in a tense political climate marked by restrictions on freedoms, an alarming decline in democracy, and a stifling economic and social crisis.
[3] Among the most prominent criticisms directed at Laclau and Mouffe's theory are:
· Marxists and realists criticize this theoretical trend for exaggerating the discursive nature of social space, thereby marginalizing economic and material structural factors.
· Some researchers have described their ideas as “incomplete discursive structures,” which makes them difficult to apply in practice. Furthermore, these ideas raise the issue of a return to structuralism, despite their claims of post-structuralism.
· One example is the concept of hostile frontiers between us and them and Mouffe's view that political identity is inherently hostile. This has been criticized for potentially legitimizing exclusionary and nationalist policies, a concern that was exacerbated by her subsequent willingness to engage with left-wing populist movements that sometimes resort to nationalist rhetoric.
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