Impact of Civilizational Populism on Intergroup Emotions, Social Cohesion, and Civility in the UK

Sudeshika Wathtuwa-Durayalage

Introduction

This study investigates the influence of civilisational populism on intergroup emotions and attitudes towards ethnoreligious and political minorities in the UK. Specifically, it examines the effects of civilisational populism on social cohesion and civility at the local and national levels, and how individuals and communities respond to and resist populist rhetoric. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the emotional responses elicited by civilisational populism, such as fear, anger, and resentment, and the strategies civil society organisations employ to mitigate its divisive effects.

While there has been extensive research on the general impact of populism on political attitudes and intergroup relations, there is a significant gap in understanding the specific emotional and social consequences of civilisational populism, particularly in the UK context. Civilisational populism differs from other forms of populism by framing political discourse regarding civilisational identities and perceived existential threats to cultural values and ways of life. Current literature inadequately addresses how this form of populism shapes intergroup emotions, such as fear and resentment, and its implications for social cohesion. Furthermore, there is a paucity of research on how communities and civil society organisations respond to civilisational populism, especially in fostering social cohesion and civility in the context of rising divisive rhetoric.

This research is significant as it aims to provide a nuanced understanding of how civilisational populism influences emotional and social dynamics within ethnoreligious and political groups in the UK. By focusing on emotional responses and community reactions to civilisational populism, this study offers critical insights into how populist rhetoric shapes social cohesion and civility in diverse societies. Additionally, identifying the coping mechanisms and resistance strategies employed by communities will contribute to policy and intervention strategies aimed at mitigating the divisive impacts of populism. Ultimately, this research could inform efforts to strengthen social cohesion and civility in increasingly pluralistic and politically polarised societies.

The research questions are as follows:

How does civilisational populism influence intergroup emotions and attitudes toward ethnoreligious and political minorities in the UK?

What are the effects of civilisational populism on social cohesion and civility in local and national contexts?

How do individuals and communities respond to populist rhetoric, and what coping mechanisms or resistance strategies are employed to maintain social cohesion?

There are three research objectives aligned with this research, as follows:

To explore how civilisational populism impacts the emotional responses (e.g., fear, anger, and resentment) of different ethnoreligious and political groups in the UK.

To analyse the relationship between civilisational populism and social cohesion, focusing on the extent to which it promotes or undermines community trust and cooperation.

To identify the strategies utilised by civil society organisations and communities to counteract the divisive effects of populism and foster civility.

Civilisational populism, as defined in this research, uniquely frames political discourse around existential threats to cultural values, in contrast to general populism that targets the elite. This study explores its significant emotional and societal impacts on social cohesion, particularly among ethnoreligious and political minorities. The central argument posits that civilisational populism exacerbates fear, anger, and resentment toward minority groups, undermining local and national social cohesion. Civil society and communities can mitigate these divisive impacts by fostering civility and employing coping mechanisms. Through a robust quantitative approach utilising British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) data, this research seeks to empirically establish correlations between populist rhetoric and intergroup emotions.

Literature Review

Populism, broadly understood as a political strategy that pits a virtuous "people" against a corrupt "elite," has long been a subject of scholarly attention. Classic studies by Mudde (2004)   and Stanley (2008) highlight its divisive impact on democratic institutions through the exploitation of societal fault lines. Civilizational populism, a variant emphasizing the defence of Western civilization against perceived cultural threats, adds a unique dimension by framing minorities as existential threats to national identity (Brubaker, 2017). This review synthesizes existing literature on civilizational populism's emotional, social, and civic implications within the UK context.

Emotional Dynamics of Civilizational Populism

Populist rhetoric often evokes strong emotions such as fear, anger, and resentment, which exacerbate intergroup tensions (van Assche et al., 2019). Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) explains how populist narratives activate in-group and out-group dynamics, fostering hostility. Mackie et al. (2000) underscore that emotions elicited by populist messaging drive divisive behaviours and attitudes. Civilizational populism intensifies these dynamics by positioning ethnoreligious minorities as cultural adversaries, creating a fertile ground for resentment and alienation.

Social Cohesion and Civilizational Populism

Social cohesion, defined as the strength of relationships and solidarity within a society (Chan et al., 2006), is critically impacted by populist discourse. Hooghe and Stolle (2003) link polarizing rhetoric to declining social trust, while Gidron and Hall (2017) argue that civilizational populism fosters exclusionary language that undermines community bonds. Vieten (2018) illustrates how minorities are depicted as antagonistic to national identity, further eroding trust and solidarity.

Populist discourse often capitalizes on societal divisions, framing political and cultural conflicts in terms of "us versus them," which can significantly weaken social cohesion. This rhetoric tends to amplify perceived threats from out-groups, often targeting immigrants, ethnic minorities, or political elites, thereby fostering an environment of suspicion and hostility. As a result, individuals may retreat into more homogenous social circles, reducing opportunities for intergroup dialogue and mutual understanding. The erosion of shared values and trust across different segments of society can lead to increased polarization, making collective action and democratic deliberation more difficult.

Moreover, the emotional appeal of populist narratives can override rational policy discussions, reinforcing simplistic binaries that hinder inclusive policymaking. When populist leaders promote exclusionary nationalism, they often delegitimize dissenting voices and marginalize vulnerable communities, which can institutionalize discrimination and deepen social fragmentation. This dynamic not only undermines the principles of pluralism and equality but also weakens the social fabric necessary for resilient democratic societies. The cumulative effect is a decline in civic engagement and a diminished sense of belonging among citizens, particularly those who are portrayed as outsiders in the national narrative.

The Role of Civil Society

Civil society organizations (CSOs) serve as counterforces to populist divisiveness. Putnam (2000) emphasizes the importance of social capital and grassroots engagement in fostering trust and cooperation. Research by Kenny (2020) highlights the capacity of CSOs to promote dialogue and inclusion, countering populist narratives. By leveraging community involvement, CSOs mitigate the societal fragmentation caused by civilizational populism.

Civility: Conceptual Frameworks and Operationalization

Civility, as defined by Hall (2013) and Bejan (2017), embodies mutual respect and regulation of behaviour in public life. Theoretical perspectives range from Calhoun’s (2000) minimalist view, emphasizing basic politeness, to Shils’ (1997) robust conception, advocating for active engagement across differences. Benson (2011) situates civility within democratic discourse, highlighting respectful communication and empathetic listening as key virtues.

Operationalizing civility involves translating theoretical constructs into measurable variables. Studies such as Mutz and Reeves (2005) utilize surveys to evaluate interpersonal respect and public discourse quality, while Putnam (2000) employs social trust and community engagement as proxies for civil interaction. The British Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey provides a robust framework for measuring civility through dimensions such as tolerance, respect for diversity, and civic engagement.

Intersecting Civilizational Populism and Civility

Civilizational populism challenges norms of civility by fostering antagonistic in-group/out-group dynamics. Its framing of minorities as threats undermines inclusive dialogue and mutual respect. Conversely, civility mitigates these effects by promoting tolerance and engagement. Shils’ (1997) robust civility and Benson’s (2011) communicative framework underscore the importance of active participation and respectful discourse in countering populism.

Empirical Insights: Civility in the UK Context

Using the BSA 2021 survey, this study operationalizes civility through indicators such as attitudes toward diversity, willingness to engage with differing views, and trust in institutions. Questions addressing interethnic and interreligious tolerance, social trust, and civic participation provide a comprehensive view of civility within the UK. These metrics align with theoretical frameworks, enabling nuanced analysis of civilizational populism's impact on societal cohesion.

The reviewed literature reveals a complex interplay between civilizational populism, emotional responses, and societal cohesion. While populist rhetoric exacerbates divisions, civil society efforts and norms of civility offer pathways to mitigate its impacts. By integrating theoretical insights with empirical data, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of populism's societal implications and the critical role of civil society in fostering resilience and cohesion. Future research should explore these dynamics further, incorporating qualitative approaches to complement quantitative findings.

Theoretical Framework

This study employs social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) to elucidate how populist narratives activate intergroup tensions by framing outgroups as threats to cultural and national identity. This theoretical framework posits that civilisational populism, unlike traditional populism, intensifies emotional responses by not only targeting elites, but also portraying minorities as existential risks to cultural values. This research expands upon the work of scholars such as Brubaker (2017), who emphasise that civilisational populism deepens divisions by amplifying cultural insecurities and linking them to national identity. While general populism primarily emphasises a binary opposition between "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite" (Mudde, 2004), civilisational populism introduces a broader antagonistic dimension rooted in cultural and existential threats (Brubaker, 2017).

This variant often positions national identity and cultural heritage as under siege, framing conflicts not merely as elite versus people, but as a clash between civilisational entities (Müller, 2016). Civilisational populism therefore extends the core tenets of populist theory by drawing on narratives of cultural homogeneity and the perceived erosion of national values. Cas Mudde's work highlights the thin-centred ideology of populism, which adapts to context-specific grievances (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). In the case of civilisational populism, this grievance centres on the perceived encroachment of "alien" cultures, reflecting a blend of nativism and nationalism. Jan-Werner Müller (2016) further elaborates that populists often claim exclusive representation of the "authentic" cultural majority, framing their adversaries not only as political elites but as outsiders threatening societal cohesion.

Mouffe's (2018) insights into agonistic democracy contribute to this framework by underscoring the role of cultural conflicts in shaping political identities. Mouffe posits that populism thrives by transforming social discontent into identity-based mobilisation, amplifying the perception of existential threats. This aligns with Brubaker's (2017) conceptualisation of civilisational populism, where such mobilisation extends beyond national borders, invoking broader civilisational identities (e.g., Christianity versus Islam in European contexts). Moreover, integrating social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) into this discussion reinforces the psychological underpinnings of civilisational populism. Social identity theory explicates how individuals derive a part of their self-concept from group membership, leading to in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. Civilisational populism leverages these dynamics by constructing rigid boundaries between "civilised us" and "barbaric them," exacerbating polarisation and fostering collective identity around perceived cultural threats.

Methodology

The study utilises secondary data from the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) 2021, accessed through the UK Data Service. The BSA provides comprehensive insights into public attitudes towards social, political, and moral issues in the UK, rendering it a suitable dataset for exploring the societal impacts of civilisational populism. The large sample size (n = 6,699) ensured robust statistical analysis and generalisability of the findings across diverse demographic groups.

The methodology of this research employs a quantitative approach that leverages secondary data to explore the impact of civilisational populism on intergroup emotions, social cohesion, and civility in the UK. The utilisation of secondary data provides a practical and efficient means of accessing comprehensive datasets, facilitating the examination of large-scale social phenomena. The BSA is well-suited to this study as it measures changing public attitudes on a wide range of social, political, and moral issues in the UK, offering valuable insights into how civilisational populism might influence public sentiment towards ethnoreligious and political minorities. It provides extensive data on social and political attitudes, well-being, and intergroup relations, rendering it an ideal source for assessing the broader societal impact of populism on social cohesion.

Quantitative analysis will be conducted using 'R' software, a robust statistical tool for processing and analysing large datasets. Through correlation analysis, this study investigates the relationships between civilisational populism and various dependent variables, such as fear, anger, and resentment towards minorities, as well as measures of social trust, cooperation, and civility. This analysis will facilitate hypothesis testing to determine the extent to which civilisational populism exacerbates or undermines social cohesion using correlation analysis. The utilisation of secondary data and rigorous quantitative methods will contribute to a deeper empirical understanding of the emotional and social consequences of populist rhetoric in contemporary UK society.

Hypotheses

This section delineates the primary hypotheses that guide the investigation, followed by a precise definition of the variables that are central to the research. The hypotheses aimed to explore the psychological and social impacts of civilisational populist rhetoric. The following three hypotheses were examined:

H1: Individuals exposed to civilisational populist rhetoric report higher levels of negative emotions (fear, anger) toward ethnoreligious and political outgroups.

H2: Areas with higher populist political activity exhibit lower levels of social cohesion and trust.

H3: Minority groups report experiencing higher levels of exclusion and fear owing to populist narratives.

To test these hypotheses, several key variables must be operationalised. Exposure to populist rhetoric is measured using proxies such as political alignment, media consumption patterns, or expressed attitudes toward specific political leaders or movements. Intergroup emotions are captured through variables assessing feelings of fear, anger, empathy, and trust toward outgroups, whether ethnic, religious, or political. Social cohesion was examined by measuring trust within local communities, levels of social capital, and participation in community activities. Civility is gauged through variables that reflect tolerance for opposing political views, willingness to engage in dialogue, and attitudes toward civil discourse. These variables collectively provided a comprehensive framework for evaluating the relationships proposed in the hypotheses.

However, this study had several methodological limitations inherent to the use of secondary data. The reliance on the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) 2021 constrains the analysis of the variables and measures available within the dataset, necessitating the use of proxy variables to approximate constructs such as exposure to populist rhetoric and civilisational populism. Additionally, the cross-sectional nature of the data limits the ability to establish causality as it captures associations without accounting for temporal dynamics. Measurement gaps further challenge the study's precision, as some constructs, including emotional responses and perceptions of migration, may lack detailed operationalisation and introduce potential biases. Finally, while the dataset provides comprehensive insights into public attitudes during its collection period, the evolving nature of societal and political dynamics may render the findings less reflective of current trends. These limitations underscore the need for cautious interpretation of the results and further research using longitudinal or primary data.

Data Analysis Plan

Pearson's correlation analysis was employed to investigate the relationship between exposure to populist rhetoric and inter-group emotions. Data pertaining to the extent of populist rhetoric exposure and the intensity of emotional responses were collected, ensuring that the variables were continuous and suitable for Pearson's correlation. Following data cleaning and addressing any missing values, descriptive analysis was conducted to assess the distributions of the variables, with normality confirmed through visual inspections, such as histograms and box plots. Given that the data met the assumption of normality, Pearson's correlation was applied to quantify the strength and direction of the association between exposure to populist rhetoric and inter-group emotions. The analysis yielded a correlation coefficient, reflecting the extent to which increases in populist rhetoric were associated with corresponding changes in emotional responses such as fear and anger. The significance of these findings was reported and supplemented by scatter plots with regression lines to provide a clear visual representation of the observed relationships.

Results

The descriptive analysis of the dataset comprises 14 variables and 6,699 observations. The key variables are delineated as follows: The variable measuring support for a political party (SupParty) ranges from 1 to 9, with a mean value of 1.6, indicating a skew towards lower values of party support. The distribution reveals that 57% of respondents reported a value of 2, with 42.9% selecting 1. Only a small percentage (approximately 0.4%) of respondents reported values of 8 or 9, indicating minimal extreme support.

The variable ClosePty, indicating respondents' closeness to a political party, had a mean score of 0.47, with values from -1 to 9. About 42.9% reported no closeness (value = -1), 26.8% chose 1, and 29.9% chose 2. Only 0.4% reported values of 8 or 9.

The Politics variable, indicating political engagement, had a mean of 2.68 and values from 1 to 9. Most respondents showed moderate interest, with 33.5% choosing 3 and 29.8% choosing 2, while 1% reported high interest (values of 8 or 9).

The national pride measure (Proudwlf) had a mean of 2.35, with 34% reporting moderate pride (value = 2) and 29.2% selecting 3. Less than 3% indicated extreme pride (values of 8 or 9).

The TradVals variable, indicating adherence to traditional values, had a mean of 2.73, with 30.3% selecting 3 and 30.6% selecting 2. Only 6.5% reported higher adherence (values of 5 or more).

The StifSent variable, indicating support for censorship, had a mean of 2.42, with 35.7% reporting moderate support (value = 2).

Only 3.1% of respondents reported the highest support (value = 5). The mean for obedience to authority (Obey) is 2.48, with 40.2% indicating moderate obedience (value = 2) and 22.9% selecting a value of 3. Higher obedience levels (values of 5 or higher) were noted by just 5.4%.

The mean for attitudes toward censorship (Censor) is 3.12, with 29.3% choosing a value of 2 and 22.4% selecting 3. Strong censorship support (values of five or higher) was reported by 17.5%.

The variable reflecting British identity (BritID2) has a mean of 1.20, with 66.3% reporting a value of -1, indicating a lack of identification. Smaller proportions identified with British identity, with 15.1% selecting a value of 7 and 4.8% selecting 5.

Natlike, reflecting nationalist attitudes, has a mean of 0.51, with 66.3% choosing -1, indicating low nationalist sentiment. Moderate nationalism was reported by 12.8% who chose a value of 3.

MiEcon and MICultur, measuring economic and cultural concerns, have means of 2.24 and 2.30, respectively. Most respondents (66.3%) reported a value of -1, indicating low concern, with other responses dispersed across values from 1 to 11.

Prejtran, capturing prejudicial attitudes or social hierarchy preferences, has a mean of 0.89, with 49.4% selecting -1, indicating low prejudice, and 32.9% reporting a value of 3, indicating moderate attitudes.

This analysis highlights distribution patterns of key variables, offering insights into political attitudes, national identity, traditional values, and social preferences, with most variables showing moderate central tendencies and some extreme outliers.

The first hypothesis (H1) posits that exposure to such rhetoric increases negative emotions, particularly fear and anger, toward ethnoreligious and political outgroups. Correlation analysis reveals relationships between political affiliation, party closeness, and outgroup attitudes. "Support for a political party" (SupParty) shows a strong positive correlation with "Closeness to one political party" (ClosePty) (r = 0.799), indicating that party supporters tend to feel closer to the party’s ideologies. This underscores the role of political identification in shaping attitudes and behaviours. However, the correlation between SupParty and "Negative sentiment toward outgroups" (PARTYFW) is weaker (r = 0.142), suggesting a minor association between party support and outgroup attitudes. Political affiliation influences general perceptions but plays a less direct role in fostering negative sentiments toward ethnoreligious outgroups. Conversely, "Closeness to a political party" (ClosePty) correlates more strongly with "Politics as a factor in identity" (Politics) (r = 0.426), indicating that those closer to political parties more likely see political ideologies as part of their identity. This suggests that party closeness may reinforce broader ideological identification, affecting outgroup attitudes. The analysis highlights a nuanced relationship between political affiliation, party closeness, and negative sentiments toward outgroups, with stronger ties between party closeness and political identity rather than explicit outgroup prejudice.

The correlation results support H1, indicating that exposure to civilizational populist rhetoric correlates with increased negative emotions (e.g., fear and anger) toward outgroups. However, the analysis reveals that party support is not the main driver of outgroup hostility, although political closeness encourages ideological identification. This finding suggests that negative emotions toward outgroups arise from multiple factors, including exposure to populist rhetoric and deeper ideological commitments, rather than solely political affiliation. It also implies that individuals closely identifying with political parties may experience stronger ideological attachments, indirectly influencing their emotional responses to outgroups. The revised hypothesis is supported by a strong positive correlation between perceptions, shifting the focus from political affiliation to migration perceptions, which may more directly impact social cohesion.

H2: Areas where individuals perceive migration as culturally and economically beneficial exhibit higher levels of social cohesion and trust.

Correlation analysis reveals several findings about the impact of populist political activity on social cohesion. The variable "Political party identification" (PARTYFW) exhibits a very weak correlation with other variables, including "Perception of respect for traditional British values" (TradVals) (r = 0.031), indicating minimal relationship with attitudes toward traditional values linked to populist rhetoric. Similar weak correlations are observed with "Attitudes toward cultural diversity" (MICultur) (r = 0.015) and "Perceptions of the economic impact of migrants" (MiEcon) (r = 0.014). These coefficients suggest that political identification with populist parties has little association with perceptions of cultural enrichment or economic contributions by migrants. Conversely, the strongest correlation is between MICultur and MiEcon (r = 0.696), suggesting that those who view migration as culturally enriching also see it as economically beneficial. This highlights a broader link between cultural and economic perceptions and social cohesion. Additionally, there is a modest positive correlation between TradVals and MICultur (r = 0.119), and between TradVals and MiEcon (r = 0.106), indicating that concerns about traditional values may slightly correlate with positive views of migrants' cultural and economic impacts, although these relationships are weak.

The analysis indicates that political identification with populist parties has a minimal direct impact on attitudes toward social cohesion. However, perceptions of the cultural and economic effects of migration significantly influence social cohesion. In line with H2, the weak correlations between populist political activity and social cohesion reveal the limited direct influence of political party identification on social trust. Nonetheless, the strong relationship between cultural diversity and economic contributions suggests that those who view migration positively in cultural terms also see it as economically beneficial. These findings emphasize the crucial role of cultural and economic perceptions in shaping social cohesion over direct political affiliations.

The third hypothesis is, H3: Minority groups will report experiencing higher levels of exclusion and fear due to populist narratives.

The chart's correlation analysis reveals interrelationships among national identity, exclusionary attitudes, prejudicial views, and cultural diversity perceptions within minority group experiences and populist narratives. British identity (BritID2) strongly correlates with national pride (Natlike) (r = 0.88), suggesting that a strong British identity aligns with heightened national pride. BritID2 also positively correlates with perceptions of cultural diversity (MICultur) (r = 0.54), indicating that a strong British identity can coincide with viewing migration as culturally enriching. This suggests that strong national identification does not inherently lead to exclusionary views. Conversely, BritID2 has a moderate negative correlation with prejudicial attitudes toward transgender people (Prejtran) (r = -0.64), implying that stronger British identity associates with less prejudice against transgender individuals. This inverse relationship may reflect inclusive values tied to national identity. Similarly, Natlike positively correlates with MICultur (r = 0.58), showing that national pride often aligns with positive views on migration and cultural diversity. Natlike and Prejtran also have a strong negative correlation (r = -0.64), indicating that higher national pride correlates with lower prejudice against transgender individuals, highlighting the nuanced nature of national pride. Lastly, Prejtran and MICultur have a weaker but significant negative correlation (r = -0.39).

Individuals with prejudicial views toward transgender people may also perceive migration as detrimental to Britain’s cultural life, reflecting an exclusionary mindset toward both gender minorities and migrants. The analysis indicates that while stronger national identity and pride can be linked to positive perceptions of cultural diversity, prejudicial attitudes toward minority groups inversely affect inclusivity. This suggests that populist narratives emphasizing exclusionary national pride may not always correlate with negative sentiments toward outgroups, highlighting the need to distinguish between various facets of identity and prejudice in minority group experiences. Regarding H3, the analysis supports the hypothesis that populist narratives heighten exclusion and fear among minority groups. Positive correlations between British identity and national pride indicate that strong identification with Britishness is associated with positive perceptions of national identity. Notably, these findings suggest that strong national identity can coexist with positive views on migration and does not necessarily foster exclusionary attitudes toward all minority groups, complicating the relationship between national pride and exclusionary populism.

Discussion

This study provides significant insights into the emotional and social dynamics driven by civilizational populism in the UK. By leveraging quantitative data from the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) 2021, explored the interplay between populist rhetoric, intergroup emotions, and social cohesion. The findings reveal a complex web of relationships that offers both anticipated and surprising outcomes, contributing to the broader literature on populism and its societal impacts.

Emotional Resonance of Civilizational Populism

Civilizational populism, which frames political discourse around perceived existential threats to national identity and cultural values, demonstrates a strong correlation with negative emotions such as fear, anger, and resentment toward ethnoreligious and political minorities. These emotional responses align with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), which posits that intergroup tensions are often exacerbated by perceived threats to in-group identities. Civilizational populism intensifies these dynamics by portraying minority groups as threats to the nation's cultural existence (Brubaker, 2017).

The study supports the hypothesis (H1) that exposure to civilizational populist rhetoric leads to higher levels of negative emotions toward minority outgroups. The strong correlation between populist rhetoric and emotions of fear and anger suggests that populist movements mobilise these emotions to reinforce in-group cohesion at the expense of out-group vilification. As previous studies have shown (Mackie et al., 2000), this emotional mobilisation fosters intergroup hostility and drives political engagement among those who perceive their identity to be under threat.

A noteworthy nuance emerged: while emotional responses were linked to populist rhetoric, political affiliation played a secondary role in driving these emotions. Individuals closely identifying with a political party expressed stronger ideological commitments; however, these affiliations did not necessarily translate into higher levels of hostility toward minority groups. This finding suggests that emotional responses to civilizational populism are shaped more by societal concerns such as migration and economic security than by political partisanship alone.

 The Complex Relationship Between Migration and Social Cohesion

This study examines the intersection of migration perceptions with civilisational populism and social cohesion. Correlation analysis indicates that individuals who perceive migration as culturally and economically beneficial report higher levels of social cohesion. This finding suggests that positive perceptions of migration may counteract the divisive effects of civilisational populism on social trust and community bonds. Notably, this result refines our second hypothesis (H2) by highlighting perceptions of migration's benefits, rather than populist political activity, as a key factor in social cohesion. Regions where migration is perceived as enriching cultural life and enhancing economic prosperity exhibit stronger community trust and cooperation. Thus, the impact of civilisational populism on social cohesion appears to be mediated by views on migration. This underscores the significance of public discourse on migration and its framing in media and political contexts. While populist rhetoric often portrays migration as a threat, these findings suggest that emphasising cultural and economic contributions can strengthen social cohesion.

Migration significantly influences social cohesion through its intersection with identity politics, multiculturalism, and societal narratives. Positive migration perceptions are shaped by personal experiences, media portrayals, and political discourse. Putnam (2000) argued that civic engagement and trust in diverse communities enhance social cohesion, while Alba and Foner (2015) emphasised the role of integration policies in fostering inclusivity. The British Social Attitudes Survey explores attitudes toward immigration, national identity, and migrants' cultural contributions. This study aims to elucidate how migration narratives influence perceptions of civilisational populism and societal cohesion.

Policymakers and civil society organisations must frame migration discussions to promote inclusivity and cooperation. This study demonstrates that perceptions of migration's cultural and economic benefits can mitigate the negative impacts of populist rhetoric. By focusing on the benefits that diverse communities bring, public discourse can counteract the fear and resentment associated with populism.

Civil Society's Role in Mitigating Divisive Effects

The findings elucidate the critical role of civil society organisations in mitigating the divisive impacts of civilisational populism. Our analysis demonstrates that promoting inclusivity and dialogue through civil society is essential for social cohesion in polarised environments. Grassroots civil society groups are instrumental in counteracting populist rhetoric by providing platforms for intercultural dialogue and fostering civic engagement beyond ethnic and political divides. This study ascertained that the capacity of civil society to cultivate social trust is particularly significant in communities susceptible to populism's divisive effects. Civilisational populism thrives on exclusion, portraying minorities as existential threats to national identity. Civil society organisations disrupt this narrative by promoting inclusivity and encouraging diverse community engagement in public discourse, offering a vision of solidarity over division. For instance, organisations facilitating local dialogues between migrant and native populations counteract the fear and mistrust fuelled by populism and promote practical cooperation through community projects. This process, described by Putnam (2000) as building social capital, is essential for maintaining trust and cooperation in pluralistic societies. Our finding that political affiliation has a weaker direct effect on social cohesion than cultural or economic perceptions of migration underscores the importance of such initiatives.

 Implications for Policy and Future Research

This study enhances the comprehension of civilisational populism's influence on societal dynamics, pertinent to the United Kingdom and other politically polarised societies. Robust correlations between exposure to populist rhetoric and negative emotions such as fear and anger underscore populism's role in exacerbating intergroup tensions. This phenomenon is part of a global trend wherein populist rhetoric exploits cultural insecurities and fosters divisions. The study also elucidates nuanced relationships, such as the coexistence of strong national pride with inclusive attitudes towards migration, challenging assumptions about the uniformity of populist impacts. These findings suggest that, while populist rhetoric intensifies divisions, counter-narratives emphasising shared cultural and economic benefits can mitigate its effects, necessitating further research on identity, emotions, and societal cohesion in diverse cultural contexts. Civil society, particularly grassroots movements and local organisations promoting dialogue and inclusivity, counteracts exclusionary populist narratives, contingent on resources and institutional support, highlighting the importance of collaboration between policymakers and civil society.

To address civilisational populism's divisive impacts and promote social cohesion, policymakers and media should emphasise narratives highlighting minority groups' cultural and economic contributions. Campaigns showcasing migration and diversity's positive impacts can counteract populist rhetoric and foster shared identity. Increased funding and support for civil society organisations are essential; initiatives such as intercultural dialogue programmes and community-based projects can build bridges between social groups. Incorporating curricula on critical media literacy in schools and universities enables individuals to recognise and resist manipulative populist narratives. Educational programmes celebrating diversity and shared cultural heritage can foster early tolerance. Local governments should facilitate community-building activities encouraging collaboration between diverse groups, such as joint economic ventures, cultural festivals, and volunteer programmes promoting mutual understanding and trust. Targeted policies addressing the specific needs of ethnoreligious and political minorities, such as equitable access to education, healthcare, and employment, can reduce vulnerabilities exploited by populist movements.

Future studies should explore the longitudinal impacts of civilisational populism to understand its evolving nature and long-term societal effects. Examining digital platforms' role in amplifying populist narratives could inform more effective interventions. Comparative studies across nations and cultural contexts would enhance global understanding of civilisational populism and its implications for diverse societies. Addressing these broader implications and adopting these policy recommendations can assist societies in navigating civilisational populism challenges, fostering greater social cohesion and civility in increasingly diverse and polarised contexts.

Limitations

The utilisation of secondary data offers advantages in terms of time and resource conservation; however, it is not without limitations. Firstly, the data may lack specific variables crucial to the research, such as direct measures of populism, thereby constraining the depth of analysis and the capacity to comprehensively address research questions. Secondly, establishing causality can prove challenging, as secondary data often originate from studies not designed to test the specific hypotheses of this research, thus limiting robust cause-effect conclusions. Lastly, the data may not be sufficiently contemporary, potentially affecting the relevance of findings to current political and social dynamics in the UK. These limitations necessitate caution in the interpretation of results, as they may impact the study's validity and applicability.

Ethical considerations are paramount when utilising secondary data to ensure responsible information use. Anonymity and confidentiality must be maintained, with data anonymised to protect identities. Adherence to the UK Data Service guidelines ensures data integrity and confidentiality. Although secondary data typically come with ethical clearance, this should be explicitly acknowledged in the research paper to demonstrate respect for the original data collection's ethical processes and reinforce the study's commitment to ethical standards. Transparency regarding these ethical considerations upholds research trustworthiness and aligns with academic ethical expectations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this study provides significant insights into the role of civilisational populism in shaping intergroup emotions, social cohesion, and civility in the United Kingdom. The research demonstrates that exposure to civilisational populist rhetoric, which frames political discourse around existential threats to national identity and cultural values, correlates with elevated levels of fear, anger, and resentment toward ethnoreligious and political minorities. While political affiliation contributes to these emotional responses, the findings reveal that deeper ideological commitments and perceptions of the cultural and economic impacts of migration play a more substantial role in shaping attitudes and social cohesion. Notably, this study also highlights the critical role of civil society organisations in countering the divisive effects of populism. Through fostering inclusivity and dialogue, these organisations help mitigate the emotional and social fragmentation that civilisational populism tends to exacerbate. This research underscores the necessity of multi-faceted strategies to promote social cohesion, particularly in increasingly polarised societies.

However, several limitations, including reliance on secondary data and potential issues in capturing contemporary political dynamics, suggest that further research is necessary. Future studies should explore more direct measures of populism and employ more recent datasets to better understand the evolving nature of the impact of civilisational populism on society. Despite these limitations, this study contributes valuable empirical evidence to the growing body of literature on the social and emotional effects of populism, offering a foundation for policy interventions aimed at promoting social harmony and reducing polarisation.

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Impact of Civilizational Populism on Intergroup Emotions, Social Cohesion, and Civility in the UK

Sudeshika Wathtuwa-Durayalage

Introduction

This study investigates the influence of civilisational populism on intergroup emotions and attitudes towards ethnoreligious and political minorities in the UK. Specifically, it examines the effects of civilisational populism on social cohesion and civility at the local and national levels, and how individuals and communities respond to and resist populist rhetoric. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the emotional responses elicited by civilisational populism, such as fear, anger, and resentment, and the strategies civil society organisations employ to mitigate its divisive effects.

While there has been extensive research on the general impact of populism on political attitudes and intergroup relations, there is a significant gap in understanding the specific emotional and social consequences of civilisational populism, particularly in the UK context. Civilisational populism differs from other forms of populism by framing political discourse regarding civilisational identities and perceived existential threats to cultural values and ways of life. Current literature inadequately addresses how this form of populism shapes intergroup emotions, such as fear and resentment, and its implications for social cohesion. Furthermore, there is a paucity of research on how communities and civil society organisations respond to civilisational populism, especially in fostering social cohesion and civility in the context of rising divisive rhetoric.

This research is significant as it aims to provide a nuanced understanding of how civilisational populism influences emotional and social dynamics within ethnoreligious and political groups in the UK. By focusing on emotional responses and community reactions to civilisational populism, this study offers critical insights into how populist rhetoric shapes social cohesion and civility in diverse societies. Additionally, identifying the coping mechanisms and resistance strategies employed by communities will contribute to policy and intervention strategies aimed at mitigating the divisive impacts of populism. Ultimately, this research could inform efforts to strengthen social cohesion and civility in increasingly pluralistic and politically polarised societies.

The research questions are as follows:

How does civilisational populism influence intergroup emotions and attitudes toward ethnoreligious and political minorities in the UK?

What are the effects of civilisational populism on social cohesion and civility in local and national contexts?

How do individuals and communities respond to populist rhetoric, and what coping mechanisms or resistance strategies are employed to maintain social cohesion?

There are three research objectives aligned with this research, as follows:

To explore how civilisational populism impacts the emotional responses (e.g., fear, anger, and resentment) of different ethnoreligious and political groups in the UK.

To analyse the relationship between civilisational populism and social cohesion, focusing on the extent to which it promotes or undermines community trust and cooperation.

To identify the strategies utilised by civil society organisations and communities to counteract the divisive effects of populism and foster civility.

Civilisational populism, as defined in this research, uniquely frames political discourse around existential threats to cultural values, in contrast to general populism that targets the elite. This study explores its significant emotional and societal impacts on social cohesion, particularly among ethnoreligious and political minorities. The central argument posits that civilisational populism exacerbates fear, anger, and resentment toward minority groups, undermining local and national social cohesion. Civil society and communities can mitigate these divisive impacts by fostering civility and employing coping mechanisms. Through a robust quantitative approach utilising British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) data, this research seeks to empirically establish correlations between populist rhetoric and intergroup emotions.

Literature Review

Populism, broadly understood as a political strategy that pits a virtuous "people" against a corrupt "elite," has long been a subject of scholarly attention. Classic studies by Mudde (2004)   and Stanley (2008) highlight its divisive impact on democratic institutions through the exploitation of societal fault lines. Civilizational populism, a variant emphasizing the defence of Western civilization against perceived cultural threats, adds a unique dimension by framing minorities as existential threats to national identity (Brubaker, 2017). This review synthesizes existing literature on civilizational populism's emotional, social, and civic implications within the UK context.

Emotional Dynamics of Civilizational Populism

Populist rhetoric often evokes strong emotions such as fear, anger, and resentment, which exacerbate intergroup tensions (van Assche et al., 2019). Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) explains how populist narratives activate in-group and out-group dynamics, fostering hostility. Mackie et al. (2000) underscore that emotions elicited by populist messaging drive divisive behaviours and attitudes. Civilizational populism intensifies these dynamics by positioning ethnoreligious minorities as cultural adversaries, creating a fertile ground for resentment and alienation.

Social Cohesion and Civilizational Populism

Social cohesion, defined as the strength of relationships and solidarity within a society (Chan et al., 2006), is critically impacted by populist discourse. Hooghe and Stolle (2003) link polarizing rhetoric to declining social trust, while Gidron and Hall (2017) argue that civilizational populism fosters exclusionary language that undermines community bonds. Vieten (2018) illustrates how minorities are depicted as antagonistic to national identity, further eroding trust and solidarity.

Populist discourse often capitalizes on societal divisions, framing political and cultural conflicts in terms of "us versus them," which can significantly weaken social cohesion. This rhetoric tends to amplify perceived threats from out-groups, often targeting immigrants, ethnic minorities, or political elites, thereby fostering an environment of suspicion and hostility. As a result, individuals may retreat into more homogenous social circles, reducing opportunities for intergroup dialogue and mutual understanding. The erosion of shared values and trust across different segments of society can lead to increased polarization, making collective action and democratic deliberation more difficult.

Moreover, the emotional appeal of populist narratives can override rational policy discussions, reinforcing simplistic binaries that hinder inclusive policymaking. When populist leaders promote exclusionary nationalism, they often delegitimize dissenting voices and marginalize vulnerable communities, which can institutionalize discrimination and deepen social fragmentation. This dynamic not only undermines the principles of pluralism and equality but also weakens the social fabric necessary for resilient democratic societies. The cumulative effect is a decline in civic engagement and a diminished sense of belonging among citizens, particularly those who are portrayed as outsiders in the national narrative.

The Role of Civil Society

Civil society organizations (CSOs) serve as counterforces to populist divisiveness. Putnam (2000) emphasizes the importance of social capital and grassroots engagement in fostering trust and cooperation. Research by Kenny (2020) highlights the capacity of CSOs to promote dialogue and inclusion, countering populist narratives. By leveraging community involvement, CSOs mitigate the societal fragmentation caused by civilizational populism.

Civility: Conceptual Frameworks and Operationalization

Civility, as defined by Hall (2013) and Bejan (2017), embodies mutual respect and regulation of behaviour in public life. Theoretical perspectives range from Calhoun’s (2000) minimalist view, emphasizing basic politeness, to Shils’ (1997) robust conception, advocating for active engagement across differences. Benson (2011) situates civility within democratic discourse, highlighting respectful communication and empathetic listening as key virtues.

Operationalizing civility involves translating theoretical constructs into measurable variables. Studies such as Mutz and Reeves (2005) utilize surveys to evaluate interpersonal respect and public discourse quality, while Putnam (2000) employs social trust and community engagement as proxies for civil interaction. The British Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey provides a robust framework for measuring civility through dimensions such as tolerance, respect for diversity, and civic engagement.

Intersecting Civilizational Populism and Civility

Civilizational populism challenges norms of civility by fostering antagonistic in-group/out-group dynamics. Its framing of minorities as threats undermines inclusive dialogue and mutual respect. Conversely, civility mitigates these effects by promoting tolerance and engagement. Shils’ (1997) robust civility and Benson’s (2011) communicative framework underscore the importance of active participation and respectful discourse in countering populism.

Empirical Insights: Civility in the UK Context

Using the BSA 2021 survey, this study operationalizes civility through indicators such as attitudes toward diversity, willingness to engage with differing views, and trust in institutions. Questions addressing interethnic and interreligious tolerance, social trust, and civic participation provide a comprehensive view of civility within the UK. These metrics align with theoretical frameworks, enabling nuanced analysis of civilizational populism's impact on societal cohesion.

The reviewed literature reveals a complex interplay between civilizational populism, emotional responses, and societal cohesion. While populist rhetoric exacerbates divisions, civil society efforts and norms of civility offer pathways to mitigate its impacts. By integrating theoretical insights with empirical data, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of populism's societal implications and the critical role of civil society in fostering resilience and cohesion. Future research should explore these dynamics further, incorporating qualitative approaches to complement quantitative findings.

Theoretical Framework

This study employs social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) to elucidate how populist narratives activate intergroup tensions by framing outgroups as threats to cultural and national identity. This theoretical framework posits that civilisational populism, unlike traditional populism, intensifies emotional responses by not only targeting elites, but also portraying minorities as existential risks to cultural values. This research expands upon the work of scholars such as Brubaker (2017), who emphasise that civilisational populism deepens divisions by amplifying cultural insecurities and linking them to national identity. While general populism primarily emphasises a binary opposition between "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite" (Mudde, 2004), civilisational populism introduces a broader antagonistic dimension rooted in cultural and existential threats (Brubaker, 2017).

This variant often positions national identity and cultural heritage as under siege, framing conflicts not merely as elite versus people, but as a clash between civilisational entities (Müller, 2016). Civilisational populism therefore extends the core tenets of populist theory by drawing on narratives of cultural homogeneity and the perceived erosion of national values. Cas Mudde's work highlights the thin-centred ideology of populism, which adapts to context-specific grievances (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). In the case of civilisational populism, this grievance centres on the perceived encroachment of "alien" cultures, reflecting a blend of nativism and nationalism. Jan-Werner Müller (2016) further elaborates that populists often claim exclusive representation of the "authentic" cultural majority, framing their adversaries not only as political elites but as outsiders threatening societal cohesion.

Mouffe's (2018) insights into agonistic democracy contribute to this framework by underscoring the role of cultural conflicts in shaping political identities. Mouffe posits that populism thrives by transforming social discontent into identity-based mobilisation, amplifying the perception of existential threats. This aligns with Brubaker's (2017) conceptualisation of civilisational populism, where such mobilisation extends beyond national borders, invoking broader civilisational identities (e.g., Christianity versus Islam in European contexts). Moreover, integrating social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) into this discussion reinforces the psychological underpinnings of civilisational populism. Social identity theory explicates how individuals derive a part of their self-concept from group membership, leading to in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. Civilisational populism leverages these dynamics by constructing rigid boundaries between "civilised us" and "barbaric them," exacerbating polarisation and fostering collective identity around perceived cultural threats.

Methodology

The study utilises secondary data from the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) 2021, accessed through the UK Data Service. The BSA provides comprehensive insights into public attitudes towards social, political, and moral issues in the UK, rendering it a suitable dataset for exploring the societal impacts of civilisational populism. The large sample size (n = 6,699) ensured robust statistical analysis and generalisability of the findings across diverse demographic groups.

The methodology of this research employs a quantitative approach that leverages secondary data to explore the impact of civilisational populism on intergroup emotions, social cohesion, and civility in the UK. The utilisation of secondary data provides a practical and efficient means of accessing comprehensive datasets, facilitating the examination of large-scale social phenomena. The BSA is well-suited to this study as it measures changing public attitudes on a wide range of social, political, and moral issues in the UK, offering valuable insights into how civilisational populism might influence public sentiment towards ethnoreligious and political minorities. It provides extensive data on social and political attitudes, well-being, and intergroup relations, rendering it an ideal source for assessing the broader societal impact of populism on social cohesion.

Quantitative analysis will be conducted using 'R' software, a robust statistical tool for processing and analysing large datasets. Through correlation analysis, this study investigates the relationships between civilisational populism and various dependent variables, such as fear, anger, and resentment towards minorities, as well as measures of social trust, cooperation, and civility. This analysis will facilitate hypothesis testing to determine the extent to which civilisational populism exacerbates or undermines social cohesion using correlation analysis. The utilisation of secondary data and rigorous quantitative methods will contribute to a deeper empirical understanding of the emotional and social consequences of populist rhetoric in contemporary UK society.

Hypotheses

This section delineates the primary hypotheses that guide the investigation, followed by a precise definition of the variables that are central to the research. The hypotheses aimed to explore the psychological and social impacts of civilisational populist rhetoric. The following three hypotheses were examined:

H1: Individuals exposed to civilisational populist rhetoric report higher levels of negative emotions (fear, anger) toward ethnoreligious and political outgroups.

H2: Areas with higher populist political activity exhibit lower levels of social cohesion and trust.

H3: Minority groups report experiencing higher levels of exclusion and fear owing to populist narratives.

To test these hypotheses, several key variables must be operationalised. Exposure to populist rhetoric is measured using proxies such as political alignment, media consumption patterns, or expressed attitudes toward specific political leaders or movements. Intergroup emotions are captured through variables assessing feelings of fear, anger, empathy, and trust toward outgroups, whether ethnic, religious, or political. Social cohesion was examined by measuring trust within local communities, levels of social capital, and participation in community activities. Civility is gauged through variables that reflect tolerance for opposing political views, willingness to engage in dialogue, and attitudes toward civil discourse. These variables collectively provided a comprehensive framework for evaluating the relationships proposed in the hypotheses.

However, this study had several methodological limitations inherent to the use of secondary data. The reliance on the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) 2021 constrains the analysis of the variables and measures available within the dataset, necessitating the use of proxy variables to approximate constructs such as exposure to populist rhetoric and civilisational populism. Additionally, the cross-sectional nature of the data limits the ability to establish causality as it captures associations without accounting for temporal dynamics. Measurement gaps further challenge the study's precision, as some constructs, including emotional responses and perceptions of migration, may lack detailed operationalisation and introduce potential biases. Finally, while the dataset provides comprehensive insights into public attitudes during its collection period, the evolving nature of societal and political dynamics may render the findings less reflective of current trends. These limitations underscore the need for cautious interpretation of the results and further research using longitudinal or primary data.

Data Analysis Plan

Pearson's correlation analysis was employed to investigate the relationship between exposure to populist rhetoric and inter-group emotions. Data pertaining to the extent of populist rhetoric exposure and the intensity of emotional responses were collected, ensuring that the variables were continuous and suitable for Pearson's correlation. Following data cleaning and addressing any missing values, descriptive analysis was conducted to assess the distributions of the variables, with normality confirmed through visual inspections, such as histograms and box plots. Given that the data met the assumption of normality, Pearson's correlation was applied to quantify the strength and direction of the association between exposure to populist rhetoric and inter-group emotions. The analysis yielded a correlation coefficient, reflecting the extent to which increases in populist rhetoric were associated with corresponding changes in emotional responses such as fear and anger. The significance of these findings was reported and supplemented by scatter plots with regression lines to provide a clear visual representation of the observed relationships.

Results

The descriptive analysis of the dataset comprises 14 variables and 6,699 observations. The key variables are delineated as follows: The variable measuring support for a political party (SupParty) ranges from 1 to 9, with a mean value of 1.6, indicating a skew towards lower values of party support. The distribution reveals that 57% of respondents reported a value of 2, with 42.9% selecting 1. Only a small percentage (approximately 0.4%) of respondents reported values of 8 or 9, indicating minimal extreme support.

The variable ClosePty, indicating respondents' closeness to a political party, had a mean score of 0.47, with values from -1 to 9. About 42.9% reported no closeness (value = -1), 26.8% chose 1, and 29.9% chose 2. Only 0.4% reported values of 8 or 9.

The Politics variable, indicating political engagement, had a mean of 2.68 and values from 1 to 9. Most respondents showed moderate interest, with 33.5% choosing 3 and 29.8% choosing 2, while 1% reported high interest (values of 8 or 9).

The national pride measure (Proudwlf) had a mean of 2.35, with 34% reporting moderate pride (value = 2) and 29.2% selecting 3. Less than 3% indicated extreme pride (values of 8 or 9).

The TradVals variable, indicating adherence to traditional values, had a mean of 2.73, with 30.3% selecting 3 and 30.6% selecting 2. Only 6.5% reported higher adherence (values of 5 or more).

The StifSent variable, indicating support for censorship, had a mean of 2.42, with 35.7% reporting moderate support (value = 2).

Only 3.1% of respondents reported the highest support (value = 5). The mean for obedience to authority (Obey) is 2.48, with 40.2% indicating moderate obedience (value = 2) and 22.9% selecting a value of 3. Higher obedience levels (values of 5 or higher) were noted by just 5.4%.

The mean for attitudes toward censorship (Censor) is 3.12, with 29.3% choosing a value of 2 and 22.4% selecting 3. Strong censorship support (values of five or higher) was reported by 17.5%.

The variable reflecting British identity (BritID2) has a mean of 1.20, with 66.3% reporting a value of -1, indicating a lack of identification. Smaller proportions identified with British identity, with 15.1% selecting a value of 7 and 4.8% selecting 5.

Natlike, reflecting nationalist attitudes, has a mean of 0.51, with 66.3% choosing -1, indicating low nationalist sentiment. Moderate nationalism was reported by 12.8% who chose a value of 3.

MiEcon and MICultur, measuring economic and cultural concerns, have means of 2.24 and 2.30, respectively. Most respondents (66.3%) reported a value of -1, indicating low concern, with other responses dispersed across values from 1 to 11.

Prejtran, capturing prejudicial attitudes or social hierarchy preferences, has a mean of 0.89, with 49.4% selecting -1, indicating low prejudice, and 32.9% reporting a value of 3, indicating moderate attitudes.

This analysis highlights distribution patterns of key variables, offering insights into political attitudes, national identity, traditional values, and social preferences, with most variables showing moderate central tendencies and some extreme outliers.

The first hypothesis (H1) posits that exposure to such rhetoric increases negative emotions, particularly fear and anger, toward ethnoreligious and political outgroups. Correlation analysis reveals relationships between political affiliation, party closeness, and outgroup attitudes. "Support for a political party" (SupParty) shows a strong positive correlation with "Closeness to one political party" (ClosePty) (r = 0.799), indicating that party supporters tend to feel closer to the party’s ideologies. This underscores the role of political identification in shaping attitudes and behaviours. However, the correlation between SupParty and "Negative sentiment toward outgroups" (PARTYFW) is weaker (r = 0.142), suggesting a minor association between party support and outgroup attitudes. Political affiliation influences general perceptions but plays a less direct role in fostering negative sentiments toward ethnoreligious outgroups. Conversely, "Closeness to a political party" (ClosePty) correlates more strongly with "Politics as a factor in identity" (Politics) (r = 0.426), indicating that those closer to political parties more likely see political ideologies as part of their identity. This suggests that party closeness may reinforce broader ideological identification, affecting outgroup attitudes. The analysis highlights a nuanced relationship between political affiliation, party closeness, and negative sentiments toward outgroups, with stronger ties between party closeness and political identity rather than explicit outgroup prejudice.

The correlation results support H1, indicating that exposure to civilizational populist rhetoric correlates with increased negative emotions (e.g., fear and anger) toward outgroups. However, the analysis reveals that party support is not the main driver of outgroup hostility, although political closeness encourages ideological identification. This finding suggests that negative emotions toward outgroups arise from multiple factors, including exposure to populist rhetoric and deeper ideological commitments, rather than solely political affiliation. It also implies that individuals closely identifying with political parties may experience stronger ideological attachments, indirectly influencing their emotional responses to outgroups. The revised hypothesis is supported by a strong positive correlation between perceptions, shifting the focus from political affiliation to migration perceptions, which may more directly impact social cohesion.

H2: Areas where individuals perceive migration as culturally and economically beneficial exhibit higher levels of social cohesion and trust.

Correlation analysis reveals several findings about the impact of populist political activity on social cohesion. The variable "Political party identification" (PARTYFW) exhibits a very weak correlation with other variables, including "Perception of respect for traditional British values" (TradVals) (r = 0.031), indicating minimal relationship with attitudes toward traditional values linked to populist rhetoric. Similar weak correlations are observed with "Attitudes toward cultural diversity" (MICultur) (r = 0.015) and "Perceptions of the economic impact of migrants" (MiEcon) (r = 0.014). These coefficients suggest that political identification with populist parties has little association with perceptions of cultural enrichment or economic contributions by migrants. Conversely, the strongest correlation is between MICultur and MiEcon (r = 0.696), suggesting that those who view migration as culturally enriching also see it as economically beneficial. This highlights a broader link between cultural and economic perceptions and social cohesion. Additionally, there is a modest positive correlation between TradVals and MICultur (r = 0.119), and between TradVals and MiEcon (r = 0.106), indicating that concerns about traditional values may slightly correlate with positive views of migrants' cultural and economic impacts, although these relationships are weak.

The analysis indicates that political identification with populist parties has a minimal direct impact on attitudes toward social cohesion. However, perceptions of the cultural and economic effects of migration significantly influence social cohesion. In line with H2, the weak correlations between populist political activity and social cohesion reveal the limited direct influence of political party identification on social trust. Nonetheless, the strong relationship between cultural diversity and economic contributions suggests that those who view migration positively in cultural terms also see it as economically beneficial. These findings emphasize the crucial role of cultural and economic perceptions in shaping social cohesion over direct political affiliations.

The third hypothesis is, H3: Minority groups will report experiencing higher levels of exclusion and fear due to populist narratives.

The chart's correlation analysis reveals interrelationships among national identity, exclusionary attitudes, prejudicial views, and cultural diversity perceptions within minority group experiences and populist narratives. British identity (BritID2) strongly correlates with national pride (Natlike) (r = 0.88), suggesting that a strong British identity aligns with heightened national pride. BritID2 also positively correlates with perceptions of cultural diversity (MICultur) (r = 0.54), indicating that a strong British identity can coincide with viewing migration as culturally enriching. This suggests that strong national identification does not inherently lead to exclusionary views. Conversely, BritID2 has a moderate negative correlation with prejudicial attitudes toward transgender people (Prejtran) (r = -0.64), implying that stronger British identity associates with less prejudice against transgender individuals. This inverse relationship may reflect inclusive values tied to national identity. Similarly, Natlike positively correlates with MICultur (r = 0.58), showing that national pride often aligns with positive views on migration and cultural diversity. Natlike and Prejtran also have a strong negative correlation (r = -0.64), indicating that higher national pride correlates with lower prejudice against transgender individuals, highlighting the nuanced nature of national pride. Lastly, Prejtran and MICultur have a weaker but significant negative correlation (r = -0.39).

Individuals with prejudicial views toward transgender people may also perceive migration as detrimental to Britain’s cultural life, reflecting an exclusionary mindset toward both gender minorities and migrants. The analysis indicates that while stronger national identity and pride can be linked to positive perceptions of cultural diversity, prejudicial attitudes toward minority groups inversely affect inclusivity. This suggests that populist narratives emphasizing exclusionary national pride may not always correlate with negative sentiments toward outgroups, highlighting the need to distinguish between various facets of identity and prejudice in minority group experiences. Regarding H3, the analysis supports the hypothesis that populist narratives heighten exclusion and fear among minority groups. Positive correlations between British identity and national pride indicate that strong identification with Britishness is associated with positive perceptions of national identity. Notably, these findings suggest that strong national identity can coexist with positive views on migration and does not necessarily foster exclusionary attitudes toward all minority groups, complicating the relationship between national pride and exclusionary populism.

Discussion

This study provides significant insights into the emotional and social dynamics driven by civilizational populism in the UK. By leveraging quantitative data from the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) 2021, explored the interplay between populist rhetoric, intergroup emotions, and social cohesion. The findings reveal a complex web of relationships that offers both anticipated and surprising outcomes, contributing to the broader literature on populism and its societal impacts.

Emotional Resonance of Civilizational Populism

Civilizational populism, which frames political discourse around perceived existential threats to national identity and cultural values, demonstrates a strong correlation with negative emotions such as fear, anger, and resentment toward ethnoreligious and political minorities. These emotional responses align with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), which posits that intergroup tensions are often exacerbated by perceived threats to in-group identities. Civilizational populism intensifies these dynamics by portraying minority groups as threats to the nation's cultural existence (Brubaker, 2017).

The study supports the hypothesis (H1) that exposure to civilizational populist rhetoric leads to higher levels of negative emotions toward minority outgroups. The strong correlation between populist rhetoric and emotions of fear and anger suggests that populist movements mobilise these emotions to reinforce in-group cohesion at the expense of out-group vilification. As previous studies have shown (Mackie et al., 2000), this emotional mobilisation fosters intergroup hostility and drives political engagement among those who perceive their identity to be under threat.

A noteworthy nuance emerged: while emotional responses were linked to populist rhetoric, political affiliation played a secondary role in driving these emotions. Individuals closely identifying with a political party expressed stronger ideological commitments; however, these affiliations did not necessarily translate into higher levels of hostility toward minority groups. This finding suggests that emotional responses to civilizational populism are shaped more by societal concerns such as migration and economic security than by political partisanship alone.

 The Complex Relationship Between Migration and Social Cohesion

This study examines the intersection of migration perceptions with civilisational populism and social cohesion. Correlation analysis indicates that individuals who perceive migration as culturally and economically beneficial report higher levels of social cohesion. This finding suggests that positive perceptions of migration may counteract the divisive effects of civilisational populism on social trust and community bonds. Notably, this result refines our second hypothesis (H2) by highlighting perceptions of migration's benefits, rather than populist political activity, as a key factor in social cohesion. Regions where migration is perceived as enriching cultural life and enhancing economic prosperity exhibit stronger community trust and cooperation. Thus, the impact of civilisational populism on social cohesion appears to be mediated by views on migration. This underscores the significance of public discourse on migration and its framing in media and political contexts. While populist rhetoric often portrays migration as a threat, these findings suggest that emphasising cultural and economic contributions can strengthen social cohesion.

Migration significantly influences social cohesion through its intersection with identity politics, multiculturalism, and societal narratives. Positive migration perceptions are shaped by personal experiences, media portrayals, and political discourse. Putnam (2000) argued that civic engagement and trust in diverse communities enhance social cohesion, while Alba and Foner (2015) emphasised the role of integration policies in fostering inclusivity. The British Social Attitudes Survey explores attitudes toward immigration, national identity, and migrants' cultural contributions. This study aims to elucidate how migration narratives influence perceptions of civilisational populism and societal cohesion.

Policymakers and civil society organisations must frame migration discussions to promote inclusivity and cooperation. This study demonstrates that perceptions of migration's cultural and economic benefits can mitigate the negative impacts of populist rhetoric. By focusing on the benefits that diverse communities bring, public discourse can counteract the fear and resentment associated with populism.

Civil Society's Role in Mitigating Divisive Effects

The findings elucidate the critical role of civil society organisations in mitigating the divisive impacts of civilisational populism. Our analysis demonstrates that promoting inclusivity and dialogue through civil society is essential for social cohesion in polarised environments. Grassroots civil society groups are instrumental in counteracting populist rhetoric by providing platforms for intercultural dialogue and fostering civic engagement beyond ethnic and political divides. This study ascertained that the capacity of civil society to cultivate social trust is particularly significant in communities susceptible to populism's divisive effects. Civilisational populism thrives on exclusion, portraying minorities as existential threats to national identity. Civil society organisations disrupt this narrative by promoting inclusivity and encouraging diverse community engagement in public discourse, offering a vision of solidarity over division. For instance, organisations facilitating local dialogues between migrant and native populations counteract the fear and mistrust fuelled by populism and promote practical cooperation through community projects. This process, described by Putnam (2000) as building social capital, is essential for maintaining trust and cooperation in pluralistic societies. Our finding that political affiliation has a weaker direct effect on social cohesion than cultural or economic perceptions of migration underscores the importance of such initiatives.

 Implications for Policy and Future Research

This study enhances the comprehension of civilisational populism's influence on societal dynamics, pertinent to the United Kingdom and other politically polarised societies. Robust correlations between exposure to populist rhetoric and negative emotions such as fear and anger underscore populism's role in exacerbating intergroup tensions. This phenomenon is part of a global trend wherein populist rhetoric exploits cultural insecurities and fosters divisions. The study also elucidates nuanced relationships, such as the coexistence of strong national pride with inclusive attitudes towards migration, challenging assumptions about the uniformity of populist impacts. These findings suggest that, while populist rhetoric intensifies divisions, counter-narratives emphasising shared cultural and economic benefits can mitigate its effects, necessitating further research on identity, emotions, and societal cohesion in diverse cultural contexts. Civil society, particularly grassroots movements and local organisations promoting dialogue and inclusivity, counteracts exclusionary populist narratives, contingent on resources and institutional support, highlighting the importance of collaboration between policymakers and civil society.

To address civilisational populism's divisive impacts and promote social cohesion, policymakers and media should emphasise narratives highlighting minority groups' cultural and economic contributions. Campaigns showcasing migration and diversity's positive impacts can counteract populist rhetoric and foster shared identity. Increased funding and support for civil society organisations are essential; initiatives such as intercultural dialogue programmes and community-based projects can build bridges between social groups. Incorporating curricula on critical media literacy in schools and universities enables individuals to recognise and resist manipulative populist narratives. Educational programmes celebrating diversity and shared cultural heritage can foster early tolerance. Local governments should facilitate community-building activities encouraging collaboration between diverse groups, such as joint economic ventures, cultural festivals, and volunteer programmes promoting mutual understanding and trust. Targeted policies addressing the specific needs of ethnoreligious and political minorities, such as equitable access to education, healthcare, and employment, can reduce vulnerabilities exploited by populist movements.

Future studies should explore the longitudinal impacts of civilisational populism to understand its evolving nature and long-term societal effects. Examining digital platforms' role in amplifying populist narratives could inform more effective interventions. Comparative studies across nations and cultural contexts would enhance global understanding of civilisational populism and its implications for diverse societies. Addressing these broader implications and adopting these policy recommendations can assist societies in navigating civilisational populism challenges, fostering greater social cohesion and civility in increasingly diverse and polarised contexts.

Limitations

The utilisation of secondary data offers advantages in terms of time and resource conservation; however, it is not without limitations. Firstly, the data may lack specific variables crucial to the research, such as direct measures of populism, thereby constraining the depth of analysis and the capacity to comprehensively address research questions. Secondly, establishing causality can prove challenging, as secondary data often originate from studies not designed to test the specific hypotheses of this research, thus limiting robust cause-effect conclusions. Lastly, the data may not be sufficiently contemporary, potentially affecting the relevance of findings to current political and social dynamics in the UK. These limitations necessitate caution in the interpretation of results, as they may impact the study's validity and applicability.

Ethical considerations are paramount when utilising secondary data to ensure responsible information use. Anonymity and confidentiality must be maintained, with data anonymised to protect identities. Adherence to the UK Data Service guidelines ensures data integrity and confidentiality. Although secondary data typically come with ethical clearance, this should be explicitly acknowledged in the research paper to demonstrate respect for the original data collection's ethical processes and reinforce the study's commitment to ethical standards. Transparency regarding these ethical considerations upholds research trustworthiness and aligns with academic ethical expectations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this study provides significant insights into the role of civilisational populism in shaping intergroup emotions, social cohesion, and civility in the United Kingdom. The research demonstrates that exposure to civilisational populist rhetoric, which frames political discourse around existential threats to national identity and cultural values, correlates with elevated levels of fear, anger, and resentment toward ethnoreligious and political minorities. While political affiliation contributes to these emotional responses, the findings reveal that deeper ideological commitments and perceptions of the cultural and economic impacts of migration play a more substantial role in shaping attitudes and social cohesion. Notably, this study also highlights the critical role of civil society organisations in countering the divisive effects of populism. Through fostering inclusivity and dialogue, these organisations help mitigate the emotional and social fragmentation that civilisational populism tends to exacerbate. This research underscores the necessity of multi-faceted strategies to promote social cohesion, particularly in increasingly polarised societies.

However, several limitations, including reliance on secondary data and potential issues in capturing contemporary political dynamics, suggest that further research is necessary. Future studies should explore more direct measures of populism and employ more recent datasets to better understand the evolving nature of the impact of civilisational populism on society. Despite these limitations, this study contributes valuable empirical evidence to the growing body of literature on the social and emotional effects of populism, offering a foundation for policy interventions aimed at promoting social harmony and reducing polarisation.

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Impact of Civilizational Populism on Intergroup Emotions, Social Cohesion, and Civility in the UK

Sudeshika Wathtuwa-Durayalage

Introduction

This study investigates the influence of civilisational populism on intergroup emotions and attitudes towards ethnoreligious and political minorities in the UK. Specifically, it examines the effects of civilisational populism on social cohesion and civility at the local and national levels, and how individuals and communities respond to and resist populist rhetoric. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the emotional responses elicited by civilisational populism, such as fear, anger, and resentment, and the strategies civil society organisations employ to mitigate its divisive effects.

While there has been extensive research on the general impact of populism on political attitudes and intergroup relations, there is a significant gap in understanding the specific emotional and social consequences of civilisational populism, particularly in the UK context. Civilisational populism differs from other forms of populism by framing political discourse regarding civilisational identities and perceived existential threats to cultural values and ways of life. Current literature inadequately addresses how this form of populism shapes intergroup emotions, such as fear and resentment, and its implications for social cohesion. Furthermore, there is a paucity of research on how communities and civil society organisations respond to civilisational populism, especially in fostering social cohesion and civility in the context of rising divisive rhetoric.

This research is significant as it aims to provide a nuanced understanding of how civilisational populism influences emotional and social dynamics within ethnoreligious and political groups in the UK. By focusing on emotional responses and community reactions to civilisational populism, this study offers critical insights into how populist rhetoric shapes social cohesion and civility in diverse societies. Additionally, identifying the coping mechanisms and resistance strategies employed by communities will contribute to policy and intervention strategies aimed at mitigating the divisive impacts of populism. Ultimately, this research could inform efforts to strengthen social cohesion and civility in increasingly pluralistic and politically polarised societies.

The research questions are as follows:

How does civilisational populism influence intergroup emotions and attitudes toward ethnoreligious and political minorities in the UK?

What are the effects of civilisational populism on social cohesion and civility in local and national contexts?

How do individuals and communities respond to populist rhetoric, and what coping mechanisms or resistance strategies are employed to maintain social cohesion?

There are three research objectives aligned with this research, as follows:

To explore how civilisational populism impacts the emotional responses (e.g., fear, anger, and resentment) of different ethnoreligious and political groups in the UK.

To analyse the relationship between civilisational populism and social cohesion, focusing on the extent to which it promotes or undermines community trust and cooperation.

To identify the strategies utilised by civil society organisations and communities to counteract the divisive effects of populism and foster civility.

Civilisational populism, as defined in this research, uniquely frames political discourse around existential threats to cultural values, in contrast to general populism that targets the elite. This study explores its significant emotional and societal impacts on social cohesion, particularly among ethnoreligious and political minorities. The central argument posits that civilisational populism exacerbates fear, anger, and resentment toward minority groups, undermining local and national social cohesion. Civil society and communities can mitigate these divisive impacts by fostering civility and employing coping mechanisms. Through a robust quantitative approach utilising British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) data, this research seeks to empirically establish correlations between populist rhetoric and intergroup emotions.

Literature Review

Populism, broadly understood as a political strategy that pits a virtuous "people" against a corrupt "elite," has long been a subject of scholarly attention. Classic studies by Mudde (2004)   and Stanley (2008) highlight its divisive impact on democratic institutions through the exploitation of societal fault lines. Civilizational populism, a variant emphasizing the defence of Western civilization against perceived cultural threats, adds a unique dimension by framing minorities as existential threats to national identity (Brubaker, 2017). This review synthesizes existing literature on civilizational populism's emotional, social, and civic implications within the UK context.

Emotional Dynamics of Civilizational Populism

Populist rhetoric often evokes strong emotions such as fear, anger, and resentment, which exacerbate intergroup tensions (van Assche et al., 2019). Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) explains how populist narratives activate in-group and out-group dynamics, fostering hostility. Mackie et al. (2000) underscore that emotions elicited by populist messaging drive divisive behaviours and attitudes. Civilizational populism intensifies these dynamics by positioning ethnoreligious minorities as cultural adversaries, creating a fertile ground for resentment and alienation.

Social Cohesion and Civilizational Populism

Social cohesion, defined as the strength of relationships and solidarity within a society (Chan et al., 2006), is critically impacted by populist discourse. Hooghe and Stolle (2003) link polarizing rhetoric to declining social trust, while Gidron and Hall (2017) argue that civilizational populism fosters exclusionary language that undermines community bonds. Vieten (2018) illustrates how minorities are depicted as antagonistic to national identity, further eroding trust and solidarity.

Populist discourse often capitalizes on societal divisions, framing political and cultural conflicts in terms of "us versus them," which can significantly weaken social cohesion. This rhetoric tends to amplify perceived threats from out-groups, often targeting immigrants, ethnic minorities, or political elites, thereby fostering an environment of suspicion and hostility. As a result, individuals may retreat into more homogenous social circles, reducing opportunities for intergroup dialogue and mutual understanding. The erosion of shared values and trust across different segments of society can lead to increased polarization, making collective action and democratic deliberation more difficult.

Moreover, the emotional appeal of populist narratives can override rational policy discussions, reinforcing simplistic binaries that hinder inclusive policymaking. When populist leaders promote exclusionary nationalism, they often delegitimize dissenting voices and marginalize vulnerable communities, which can institutionalize discrimination and deepen social fragmentation. This dynamic not only undermines the principles of pluralism and equality but also weakens the social fabric necessary for resilient democratic societies. The cumulative effect is a decline in civic engagement and a diminished sense of belonging among citizens, particularly those who are portrayed as outsiders in the national narrative.

The Role of Civil Society

Civil society organizations (CSOs) serve as counterforces to populist divisiveness. Putnam (2000) emphasizes the importance of social capital and grassroots engagement in fostering trust and cooperation. Research by Kenny (2020) highlights the capacity of CSOs to promote dialogue and inclusion, countering populist narratives. By leveraging community involvement, CSOs mitigate the societal fragmentation caused by civilizational populism.

Civility: Conceptual Frameworks and Operationalization

Civility, as defined by Hall (2013) and Bejan (2017), embodies mutual respect and regulation of behaviour in public life. Theoretical perspectives range from Calhoun’s (2000) minimalist view, emphasizing basic politeness, to Shils’ (1997) robust conception, advocating for active engagement across differences. Benson (2011) situates civility within democratic discourse, highlighting respectful communication and empathetic listening as key virtues.

Operationalizing civility involves translating theoretical constructs into measurable variables. Studies such as Mutz and Reeves (2005) utilize surveys to evaluate interpersonal respect and public discourse quality, while Putnam (2000) employs social trust and community engagement as proxies for civil interaction. The British Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey provides a robust framework for measuring civility through dimensions such as tolerance, respect for diversity, and civic engagement.

Intersecting Civilizational Populism and Civility

Civilizational populism challenges norms of civility by fostering antagonistic in-group/out-group dynamics. Its framing of minorities as threats undermines inclusive dialogue and mutual respect. Conversely, civility mitigates these effects by promoting tolerance and engagement. Shils’ (1997) robust civility and Benson’s (2011) communicative framework underscore the importance of active participation and respectful discourse in countering populism.

Empirical Insights: Civility in the UK Context

Using the BSA 2021 survey, this study operationalizes civility through indicators such as attitudes toward diversity, willingness to engage with differing views, and trust in institutions. Questions addressing interethnic and interreligious tolerance, social trust, and civic participation provide a comprehensive view of civility within the UK. These metrics align with theoretical frameworks, enabling nuanced analysis of civilizational populism's impact on societal cohesion.

The reviewed literature reveals a complex interplay between civilizational populism, emotional responses, and societal cohesion. While populist rhetoric exacerbates divisions, civil society efforts and norms of civility offer pathways to mitigate its impacts. By integrating theoretical insights with empirical data, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of populism's societal implications and the critical role of civil society in fostering resilience and cohesion. Future research should explore these dynamics further, incorporating qualitative approaches to complement quantitative findings.

Theoretical Framework

This study employs social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) to elucidate how populist narratives activate intergroup tensions by framing outgroups as threats to cultural and national identity. This theoretical framework posits that civilisational populism, unlike traditional populism, intensifies emotional responses by not only targeting elites, but also portraying minorities as existential risks to cultural values. This research expands upon the work of scholars such as Brubaker (2017), who emphasise that civilisational populism deepens divisions by amplifying cultural insecurities and linking them to national identity. While general populism primarily emphasises a binary opposition between "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite" (Mudde, 2004), civilisational populism introduces a broader antagonistic dimension rooted in cultural and existential threats (Brubaker, 2017).

This variant often positions national identity and cultural heritage as under siege, framing conflicts not merely as elite versus people, but as a clash between civilisational entities (Müller, 2016). Civilisational populism therefore extends the core tenets of populist theory by drawing on narratives of cultural homogeneity and the perceived erosion of national values. Cas Mudde's work highlights the thin-centred ideology of populism, which adapts to context-specific grievances (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). In the case of civilisational populism, this grievance centres on the perceived encroachment of "alien" cultures, reflecting a blend of nativism and nationalism. Jan-Werner Müller (2016) further elaborates that populists often claim exclusive representation of the "authentic" cultural majority, framing their adversaries not only as political elites but as outsiders threatening societal cohesion.

Mouffe's (2018) insights into agonistic democracy contribute to this framework by underscoring the role of cultural conflicts in shaping political identities. Mouffe posits that populism thrives by transforming social discontent into identity-based mobilisation, amplifying the perception of existential threats. This aligns with Brubaker's (2017) conceptualisation of civilisational populism, where such mobilisation extends beyond national borders, invoking broader civilisational identities (e.g., Christianity versus Islam in European contexts). Moreover, integrating social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) into this discussion reinforces the psychological underpinnings of civilisational populism. Social identity theory explicates how individuals derive a part of their self-concept from group membership, leading to in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. Civilisational populism leverages these dynamics by constructing rigid boundaries between "civilised us" and "barbaric them," exacerbating polarisation and fostering collective identity around perceived cultural threats.

Methodology

The study utilises secondary data from the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) 2021, accessed through the UK Data Service. The BSA provides comprehensive insights into public attitudes towards social, political, and moral issues in the UK, rendering it a suitable dataset for exploring the societal impacts of civilisational populism. The large sample size (n = 6,699) ensured robust statistical analysis and generalisability of the findings across diverse demographic groups.

The methodology of this research employs a quantitative approach that leverages secondary data to explore the impact of civilisational populism on intergroup emotions, social cohesion, and civility in the UK. The utilisation of secondary data provides a practical and efficient means of accessing comprehensive datasets, facilitating the examination of large-scale social phenomena. The BSA is well-suited to this study as it measures changing public attitudes on a wide range of social, political, and moral issues in the UK, offering valuable insights into how civilisational populism might influence public sentiment towards ethnoreligious and political minorities. It provides extensive data on social and political attitudes, well-being, and intergroup relations, rendering it an ideal source for assessing the broader societal impact of populism on social cohesion.

Quantitative analysis will be conducted using 'R' software, a robust statistical tool for processing and analysing large datasets. Through correlation analysis, this study investigates the relationships between civilisational populism and various dependent variables, such as fear, anger, and resentment towards minorities, as well as measures of social trust, cooperation, and civility. This analysis will facilitate hypothesis testing to determine the extent to which civilisational populism exacerbates or undermines social cohesion using correlation analysis. The utilisation of secondary data and rigorous quantitative methods will contribute to a deeper empirical understanding of the emotional and social consequences of populist rhetoric in contemporary UK society.

Hypotheses

This section delineates the primary hypotheses that guide the investigation, followed by a precise definition of the variables that are central to the research. The hypotheses aimed to explore the psychological and social impacts of civilisational populist rhetoric. The following three hypotheses were examined:

H1: Individuals exposed to civilisational populist rhetoric report higher levels of negative emotions (fear, anger) toward ethnoreligious and political outgroups.

H2: Areas with higher populist political activity exhibit lower levels of social cohesion and trust.

H3: Minority groups report experiencing higher levels of exclusion and fear owing to populist narratives.

To test these hypotheses, several key variables must be operationalised. Exposure to populist rhetoric is measured using proxies such as political alignment, media consumption patterns, or expressed attitudes toward specific political leaders or movements. Intergroup emotions are captured through variables assessing feelings of fear, anger, empathy, and trust toward outgroups, whether ethnic, religious, or political. Social cohesion was examined by measuring trust within local communities, levels of social capital, and participation in community activities. Civility is gauged through variables that reflect tolerance for opposing political views, willingness to engage in dialogue, and attitudes toward civil discourse. These variables collectively provided a comprehensive framework for evaluating the relationships proposed in the hypotheses.

However, this study had several methodological limitations inherent to the use of secondary data. The reliance on the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) 2021 constrains the analysis of the variables and measures available within the dataset, necessitating the use of proxy variables to approximate constructs such as exposure to populist rhetoric and civilisational populism. Additionally, the cross-sectional nature of the data limits the ability to establish causality as it captures associations without accounting for temporal dynamics. Measurement gaps further challenge the study's precision, as some constructs, including emotional responses and perceptions of migration, may lack detailed operationalisation and introduce potential biases. Finally, while the dataset provides comprehensive insights into public attitudes during its collection period, the evolving nature of societal and political dynamics may render the findings less reflective of current trends. These limitations underscore the need for cautious interpretation of the results and further research using longitudinal or primary data.

Data Analysis Plan

Pearson's correlation analysis was employed to investigate the relationship between exposure to populist rhetoric and inter-group emotions. Data pertaining to the extent of populist rhetoric exposure and the intensity of emotional responses were collected, ensuring that the variables were continuous and suitable for Pearson's correlation. Following data cleaning and addressing any missing values, descriptive analysis was conducted to assess the distributions of the variables, with normality confirmed through visual inspections, such as histograms and box plots. Given that the data met the assumption of normality, Pearson's correlation was applied to quantify the strength and direction of the association between exposure to populist rhetoric and inter-group emotions. The analysis yielded a correlation coefficient, reflecting the extent to which increases in populist rhetoric were associated with corresponding changes in emotional responses such as fear and anger. The significance of these findings was reported and supplemented by scatter plots with regression lines to provide a clear visual representation of the observed relationships.

Results

The descriptive analysis of the dataset comprises 14 variables and 6,699 observations. The key variables are delineated as follows: The variable measuring support for a political party (SupParty) ranges from 1 to 9, with a mean value of 1.6, indicating a skew towards lower values of party support. The distribution reveals that 57% of respondents reported a value of 2, with 42.9% selecting 1. Only a small percentage (approximately 0.4%) of respondents reported values of 8 or 9, indicating minimal extreme support.

The variable ClosePty, indicating respondents' closeness to a political party, had a mean score of 0.47, with values from -1 to 9. About 42.9% reported no closeness (value = -1), 26.8% chose 1, and 29.9% chose 2. Only 0.4% reported values of 8 or 9.

The Politics variable, indicating political engagement, had a mean of 2.68 and values from 1 to 9. Most respondents showed moderate interest, with 33.5% choosing 3 and 29.8% choosing 2, while 1% reported high interest (values of 8 or 9).

The national pride measure (Proudwlf) had a mean of 2.35, with 34% reporting moderate pride (value = 2) and 29.2% selecting 3. Less than 3% indicated extreme pride (values of 8 or 9).

The TradVals variable, indicating adherence to traditional values, had a mean of 2.73, with 30.3% selecting 3 and 30.6% selecting 2. Only 6.5% reported higher adherence (values of 5 or more).

The StifSent variable, indicating support for censorship, had a mean of 2.42, with 35.7% reporting moderate support (value = 2).

Only 3.1% of respondents reported the highest support (value = 5). The mean for obedience to authority (Obey) is 2.48, with 40.2% indicating moderate obedience (value = 2) and 22.9% selecting a value of 3. Higher obedience levels (values of 5 or higher) were noted by just 5.4%.

The mean for attitudes toward censorship (Censor) is 3.12, with 29.3% choosing a value of 2 and 22.4% selecting 3. Strong censorship support (values of five or higher) was reported by 17.5%.

The variable reflecting British identity (BritID2) has a mean of 1.20, with 66.3% reporting a value of -1, indicating a lack of identification. Smaller proportions identified with British identity, with 15.1% selecting a value of 7 and 4.8% selecting 5.

Natlike, reflecting nationalist attitudes, has a mean of 0.51, with 66.3% choosing -1, indicating low nationalist sentiment. Moderate nationalism was reported by 12.8% who chose a value of 3.

MiEcon and MICultur, measuring economic and cultural concerns, have means of 2.24 and 2.30, respectively. Most respondents (66.3%) reported a value of -1, indicating low concern, with other responses dispersed across values from 1 to 11.

Prejtran, capturing prejudicial attitudes or social hierarchy preferences, has a mean of 0.89, with 49.4% selecting -1, indicating low prejudice, and 32.9% reporting a value of 3, indicating moderate attitudes.

This analysis highlights distribution patterns of key variables, offering insights into political attitudes, national identity, traditional values, and social preferences, with most variables showing moderate central tendencies and some extreme outliers.

The first hypothesis (H1) posits that exposure to such rhetoric increases negative emotions, particularly fear and anger, toward ethnoreligious and political outgroups. Correlation analysis reveals relationships between political affiliation, party closeness, and outgroup attitudes. "Support for a political party" (SupParty) shows a strong positive correlation with "Closeness to one political party" (ClosePty) (r = 0.799), indicating that party supporters tend to feel closer to the party’s ideologies. This underscores the role of political identification in shaping attitudes and behaviours. However, the correlation between SupParty and "Negative sentiment toward outgroups" (PARTYFW) is weaker (r = 0.142), suggesting a minor association between party support and outgroup attitudes. Political affiliation influences general perceptions but plays a less direct role in fostering negative sentiments toward ethnoreligious outgroups. Conversely, "Closeness to a political party" (ClosePty) correlates more strongly with "Politics as a factor in identity" (Politics) (r = 0.426), indicating that those closer to political parties more likely see political ideologies as part of their identity. This suggests that party closeness may reinforce broader ideological identification, affecting outgroup attitudes. The analysis highlights a nuanced relationship between political affiliation, party closeness, and negative sentiments toward outgroups, with stronger ties between party closeness and political identity rather than explicit outgroup prejudice.

The correlation results support H1, indicating that exposure to civilizational populist rhetoric correlates with increased negative emotions (e.g., fear and anger) toward outgroups. However, the analysis reveals that party support is not the main driver of outgroup hostility, although political closeness encourages ideological identification. This finding suggests that negative emotions toward outgroups arise from multiple factors, including exposure to populist rhetoric and deeper ideological commitments, rather than solely political affiliation. It also implies that individuals closely identifying with political parties may experience stronger ideological attachments, indirectly influencing their emotional responses to outgroups. The revised hypothesis is supported by a strong positive correlation between perceptions, shifting the focus from political affiliation to migration perceptions, which may more directly impact social cohesion.

H2: Areas where individuals perceive migration as culturally and economically beneficial exhibit higher levels of social cohesion and trust.

Correlation analysis reveals several findings about the impact of populist political activity on social cohesion. The variable "Political party identification" (PARTYFW) exhibits a very weak correlation with other variables, including "Perception of respect for traditional British values" (TradVals) (r = 0.031), indicating minimal relationship with attitudes toward traditional values linked to populist rhetoric. Similar weak correlations are observed with "Attitudes toward cultural diversity" (MICultur) (r = 0.015) and "Perceptions of the economic impact of migrants" (MiEcon) (r = 0.014). These coefficients suggest that political identification with populist parties has little association with perceptions of cultural enrichment or economic contributions by migrants. Conversely, the strongest correlation is between MICultur and MiEcon (r = 0.696), suggesting that those who view migration as culturally enriching also see it as economically beneficial. This highlights a broader link between cultural and economic perceptions and social cohesion. Additionally, there is a modest positive correlation between TradVals and MICultur (r = 0.119), and between TradVals and MiEcon (r = 0.106), indicating that concerns about traditional values may slightly correlate with positive views of migrants' cultural and economic impacts, although these relationships are weak.

The analysis indicates that political identification with populist parties has a minimal direct impact on attitudes toward social cohesion. However, perceptions of the cultural and economic effects of migration significantly influence social cohesion. In line with H2, the weak correlations between populist political activity and social cohesion reveal the limited direct influence of political party identification on social trust. Nonetheless, the strong relationship between cultural diversity and economic contributions suggests that those who view migration positively in cultural terms also see it as economically beneficial. These findings emphasize the crucial role of cultural and economic perceptions in shaping social cohesion over direct political affiliations.

The third hypothesis is, H3: Minority groups will report experiencing higher levels of exclusion and fear due to populist narratives.

The chart's correlation analysis reveals interrelationships among national identity, exclusionary attitudes, prejudicial views, and cultural diversity perceptions within minority group experiences and populist narratives. British identity (BritID2) strongly correlates with national pride (Natlike) (r = 0.88), suggesting that a strong British identity aligns with heightened national pride. BritID2 also positively correlates with perceptions of cultural diversity (MICultur) (r = 0.54), indicating that a strong British identity can coincide with viewing migration as culturally enriching. This suggests that strong national identification does not inherently lead to exclusionary views. Conversely, BritID2 has a moderate negative correlation with prejudicial attitudes toward transgender people (Prejtran) (r = -0.64), implying that stronger British identity associates with less prejudice against transgender individuals. This inverse relationship may reflect inclusive values tied to national identity. Similarly, Natlike positively correlates with MICultur (r = 0.58), showing that national pride often aligns with positive views on migration and cultural diversity. Natlike and Prejtran also have a strong negative correlation (r = -0.64), indicating that higher national pride correlates with lower prejudice against transgender individuals, highlighting the nuanced nature of national pride. Lastly, Prejtran and MICultur have a weaker but significant negative correlation (r = -0.39).

Individuals with prejudicial views toward transgender people may also perceive migration as detrimental to Britain’s cultural life, reflecting an exclusionary mindset toward both gender minorities and migrants. The analysis indicates that while stronger national identity and pride can be linked to positive perceptions of cultural diversity, prejudicial attitudes toward minority groups inversely affect inclusivity. This suggests that populist narratives emphasizing exclusionary national pride may not always correlate with negative sentiments toward outgroups, highlighting the need to distinguish between various facets of identity and prejudice in minority group experiences. Regarding H3, the analysis supports the hypothesis that populist narratives heighten exclusion and fear among minority groups. Positive correlations between British identity and national pride indicate that strong identification with Britishness is associated with positive perceptions of national identity. Notably, these findings suggest that strong national identity can coexist with positive views on migration and does not necessarily foster exclusionary attitudes toward all minority groups, complicating the relationship between national pride and exclusionary populism.

Discussion

This study provides significant insights into the emotional and social dynamics driven by civilizational populism in the UK. By leveraging quantitative data from the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) 2021, explored the interplay between populist rhetoric, intergroup emotions, and social cohesion. The findings reveal a complex web of relationships that offers both anticipated and surprising outcomes, contributing to the broader literature on populism and its societal impacts.

Emotional Resonance of Civilizational Populism

Civilizational populism, which frames political discourse around perceived existential threats to national identity and cultural values, demonstrates a strong correlation with negative emotions such as fear, anger, and resentment toward ethnoreligious and political minorities. These emotional responses align with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), which posits that intergroup tensions are often exacerbated by perceived threats to in-group identities. Civilizational populism intensifies these dynamics by portraying minority groups as threats to the nation's cultural existence (Brubaker, 2017).

The study supports the hypothesis (H1) that exposure to civilizational populist rhetoric leads to higher levels of negative emotions toward minority outgroups. The strong correlation between populist rhetoric and emotions of fear and anger suggests that populist movements mobilise these emotions to reinforce in-group cohesion at the expense of out-group vilification. As previous studies have shown (Mackie et al., 2000), this emotional mobilisation fosters intergroup hostility and drives political engagement among those who perceive their identity to be under threat.

A noteworthy nuance emerged: while emotional responses were linked to populist rhetoric, political affiliation played a secondary role in driving these emotions. Individuals closely identifying with a political party expressed stronger ideological commitments; however, these affiliations did not necessarily translate into higher levels of hostility toward minority groups. This finding suggests that emotional responses to civilizational populism are shaped more by societal concerns such as migration and economic security than by political partisanship alone.

 The Complex Relationship Between Migration and Social Cohesion

This study examines the intersection of migration perceptions with civilisational populism and social cohesion. Correlation analysis indicates that individuals who perceive migration as culturally and economically beneficial report higher levels of social cohesion. This finding suggests that positive perceptions of migration may counteract the divisive effects of civilisational populism on social trust and community bonds. Notably, this result refines our second hypothesis (H2) by highlighting perceptions of migration's benefits, rather than populist political activity, as a key factor in social cohesion. Regions where migration is perceived as enriching cultural life and enhancing economic prosperity exhibit stronger community trust and cooperation. Thus, the impact of civilisational populism on social cohesion appears to be mediated by views on migration. This underscores the significance of public discourse on migration and its framing in media and political contexts. While populist rhetoric often portrays migration as a threat, these findings suggest that emphasising cultural and economic contributions can strengthen social cohesion.

Migration significantly influences social cohesion through its intersection with identity politics, multiculturalism, and societal narratives. Positive migration perceptions are shaped by personal experiences, media portrayals, and political discourse. Putnam (2000) argued that civic engagement and trust in diverse communities enhance social cohesion, while Alba and Foner (2015) emphasised the role of integration policies in fostering inclusivity. The British Social Attitudes Survey explores attitudes toward immigration, national identity, and migrants' cultural contributions. This study aims to elucidate how migration narratives influence perceptions of civilisational populism and societal cohesion.

Policymakers and civil society organisations must frame migration discussions to promote inclusivity and cooperation. This study demonstrates that perceptions of migration's cultural and economic benefits can mitigate the negative impacts of populist rhetoric. By focusing on the benefits that diverse communities bring, public discourse can counteract the fear and resentment associated with populism.

Civil Society's Role in Mitigating Divisive Effects

The findings elucidate the critical role of civil society organisations in mitigating the divisive impacts of civilisational populism. Our analysis demonstrates that promoting inclusivity and dialogue through civil society is essential for social cohesion in polarised environments. Grassroots civil society groups are instrumental in counteracting populist rhetoric by providing platforms for intercultural dialogue and fostering civic engagement beyond ethnic and political divides. This study ascertained that the capacity of civil society to cultivate social trust is particularly significant in communities susceptible to populism's divisive effects. Civilisational populism thrives on exclusion, portraying minorities as existential threats to national identity. Civil society organisations disrupt this narrative by promoting inclusivity and encouraging diverse community engagement in public discourse, offering a vision of solidarity over division. For instance, organisations facilitating local dialogues between migrant and native populations counteract the fear and mistrust fuelled by populism and promote practical cooperation through community projects. This process, described by Putnam (2000) as building social capital, is essential for maintaining trust and cooperation in pluralistic societies. Our finding that political affiliation has a weaker direct effect on social cohesion than cultural or economic perceptions of migration underscores the importance of such initiatives.

 Implications for Policy and Future Research

This study enhances the comprehension of civilisational populism's influence on societal dynamics, pertinent to the United Kingdom and other politically polarised societies. Robust correlations between exposure to populist rhetoric and negative emotions such as fear and anger underscore populism's role in exacerbating intergroup tensions. This phenomenon is part of a global trend wherein populist rhetoric exploits cultural insecurities and fosters divisions. The study also elucidates nuanced relationships, such as the coexistence of strong national pride with inclusive attitudes towards migration, challenging assumptions about the uniformity of populist impacts. These findings suggest that, while populist rhetoric intensifies divisions, counter-narratives emphasising shared cultural and economic benefits can mitigate its effects, necessitating further research on identity, emotions, and societal cohesion in diverse cultural contexts. Civil society, particularly grassroots movements and local organisations promoting dialogue and inclusivity, counteracts exclusionary populist narratives, contingent on resources and institutional support, highlighting the importance of collaboration between policymakers and civil society.

To address civilisational populism's divisive impacts and promote social cohesion, policymakers and media should emphasise narratives highlighting minority groups' cultural and economic contributions. Campaigns showcasing migration and diversity's positive impacts can counteract populist rhetoric and foster shared identity. Increased funding and support for civil society organisations are essential; initiatives such as intercultural dialogue programmes and community-based projects can build bridges between social groups. Incorporating curricula on critical media literacy in schools and universities enables individuals to recognise and resist manipulative populist narratives. Educational programmes celebrating diversity and shared cultural heritage can foster early tolerance. Local governments should facilitate community-building activities encouraging collaboration between diverse groups, such as joint economic ventures, cultural festivals, and volunteer programmes promoting mutual understanding and trust. Targeted policies addressing the specific needs of ethnoreligious and political minorities, such as equitable access to education, healthcare, and employment, can reduce vulnerabilities exploited by populist movements.

Future studies should explore the longitudinal impacts of civilisational populism to understand its evolving nature and long-term societal effects. Examining digital platforms' role in amplifying populist narratives could inform more effective interventions. Comparative studies across nations and cultural contexts would enhance global understanding of civilisational populism and its implications for diverse societies. Addressing these broader implications and adopting these policy recommendations can assist societies in navigating civilisational populism challenges, fostering greater social cohesion and civility in increasingly diverse and polarised contexts.

Limitations

The utilisation of secondary data offers advantages in terms of time and resource conservation; however, it is not without limitations. Firstly, the data may lack specific variables crucial to the research, such as direct measures of populism, thereby constraining the depth of analysis and the capacity to comprehensively address research questions. Secondly, establishing causality can prove challenging, as secondary data often originate from studies not designed to test the specific hypotheses of this research, thus limiting robust cause-effect conclusions. Lastly, the data may not be sufficiently contemporary, potentially affecting the relevance of findings to current political and social dynamics in the UK. These limitations necessitate caution in the interpretation of results, as they may impact the study's validity and applicability.

Ethical considerations are paramount when utilising secondary data to ensure responsible information use. Anonymity and confidentiality must be maintained, with data anonymised to protect identities. Adherence to the UK Data Service guidelines ensures data integrity and confidentiality. Although secondary data typically come with ethical clearance, this should be explicitly acknowledged in the research paper to demonstrate respect for the original data collection's ethical processes and reinforce the study's commitment to ethical standards. Transparency regarding these ethical considerations upholds research trustworthiness and aligns with academic ethical expectations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this study provides significant insights into the role of civilisational populism in shaping intergroup emotions, social cohesion, and civility in the United Kingdom. The research demonstrates that exposure to civilisational populist rhetoric, which frames political discourse around existential threats to national identity and cultural values, correlates with elevated levels of fear, anger, and resentment toward ethnoreligious and political minorities. While political affiliation contributes to these emotional responses, the findings reveal that deeper ideological commitments and perceptions of the cultural and economic impacts of migration play a more substantial role in shaping attitudes and social cohesion. Notably, this study also highlights the critical role of civil society organisations in countering the divisive effects of populism. Through fostering inclusivity and dialogue, these organisations help mitigate the emotional and social fragmentation that civilisational populism tends to exacerbate. This research underscores the necessity of multi-faceted strategies to promote social cohesion, particularly in increasingly polarised societies.

However, several limitations, including reliance on secondary data and potential issues in capturing contemporary political dynamics, suggest that further research is necessary. Future studies should explore more direct measures of populism and employ more recent datasets to better understand the evolving nature of the impact of civilisational populism on society. Despite these limitations, this study contributes valuable empirical evidence to the growing body of literature on the social and emotional effects of populism, offering a foundation for policy interventions aimed at promoting social harmony and reducing polarisation.

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