1.   Introduction

The discourse of right-wing populist parties in Europe has undergone significant transformations over recent years. As digital platforms become increasingly central to political communication, populist leaders have adapted their messaging strategies to reach and engage with their audiences more effectively. This work presents an overview of several studies – both ongoing and completed – on the populist discourse in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom in 2021 and 2024. It focuses on right-wing leaders Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella of the National Rally (Rassemblement National) in France, Giorgia Meloni of Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d'Italia) and Matteo Salvini of the League (Lega) in Italy, and Nigel Farage and Richard Tice of Reform UK. The aim is to explore how they construct their ingroups and outgroups and the discursive mechanisms they employ to reinforce their political narratives, with particular attention to instrumental references to religion as an oppositional divide (civilisational populism). The ultimate scope is to highlight possible trajectories towards normalisation (Krzyżanowski, 2020). In particular, the studies investigate how right-wing populist[1]leaders in France, Italy and the UK build the identity of their ingroup and outgroup and what discursive strategies they use (RQ1), if the outgroup is defined in civilizational terms (RQ2) and if it has changed and become normalised in time (RQ3).

The results show, first of all, a remarkable focus on religion as a means to define the ingroup against the outgroup, which confirms the relevance of studying populism under a civilisational lens. Moreover, they highlight some relevant shifts in the content shared on social media and official party websites between 2021 and 2024, which outlines possible paths towards the normalisation of civilisational polarisation in mainstream political debates. Although this overview involves data sets originated in different research contexts and with different objectives, and, accordingly, does not aim to present a comparison between definitive results, it suggests a possible trajectory in the communication of rightist populist parties and opens the path for further investigation on the normalisation of polarised debate.

The following section outlines the theoretical framework underpinning the research, offering insights into populism, the concept of normalisation, civilisationism, and the Judeo-Christian tradition. Section 3 provides a detailed account of the materials and methods employed in the analysis. Section 4 presents the key findings and engages in their discussion. The final section addresses the research questions directly, expands upon the discussion, and considers possible directions for future research.

2.   Theoretical Background

2.1 Populism and Normalisation

Defining populism remains a persistent challenge due to its lack of a consistent ideological foundation, resulting in varied interpretations across different contexts. Scholars have approached populism from multiple perspectives, conceptualizing it alternately as a thin-centred ideology (Mudde, 2004), discourse (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), empty signifier (Laclau, 2007), political style (Moffitt, 2016), political strategy (Weyland, 2001), rhetorical style (Aslanidis, 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 2019) to name only a few. This conceptual plurality reflects populism’s ideological flexibility, context-specific manifestations, and pervasive presence in contemporary politics worldwide. The ideational approach emphasizes the populism’s core belief in a dichotomy between a ‘pure people’ and a ‘corrupt elite,’ framing it as a moralized form of politics. In contrast, the stylistic approach focuses on the rhetorical, performative, and aesthetic means through which populist actors communicate, including language, symbolism, and organizational practices. All of them, however, agree on considering populism as a political phenomenon without an a priori ideology, based on an ‘us-them’ opposition.

Drawing upon this definition, Ballacci and Goodman (2023) have challenged the conventional dichotomy between discursive and ideational approaches and argued that the integration of form and content is central to populism. If all kinds of politics are intrinsically connected to language (Combei & Reggi, 2024: 19-20), the nature of populism as a ‘thin-centred’ (Mudde, 2004) ideology makes it all the more dependent on rhetoric and style. While ‘hard-centred’ ideologies can rely on consolidated texts and traditions, populist content is conveyed ‘not ideationally but performatively’ (Ballacci & Goodman, 2023: 10), meaning that populist ideology is entailed in discourse as performative act (Ostiguy, 2017). Discourse, therefore, enables populist leaders to construct a broad and malleable identity for ‘the people’ – a political category that exists only through representation. This is reflected in their use of informal language, crude humour, and anti-elitist symbols to signal alignment with ‘ordinary people’ and to reject elite cultural norms (Ballacci & Goodman, 2023; Ostiguy, 2017). It is through discourse that leaders can elicit emotions such as resentment and rage against a putative enemy – whether the elites, the European Union or foreigners – while, at the same time, cultivating a hopeful narrative of popular empowerment (Ballacci & Goodman, 2023). This emotional charge compensates for the lack of a coherent ideological system and serves to as a tool for political alignment and identity formation.

Since populism relies on contingent identity, it requires continuous rearticulation of who belongs within the community and who is excluded. However, for these representations to become effective, they must become widely accepted. This is because, as Fairclough (2003: 39-61) argues, normalisation allows discourse to appear natural and legitimate, embedding it into everyday language and political narratives. This process ensures that what was once contested or marginal becomes accepted as common sense, thereby reinforcing the populist worldview within mainstream political debates.

Krzyżanowski (2020) refers the concept of normalisation to the gradual legitimisation of previously marginal or radical discourses, particularly in association with right-wing populism and its idea of ethnically homogeneous nation (exclusionary nationalism). He describes this process as driven by discursive shifts that subtly alter the way contentious issues are framed; for example, topics such as immigration or national identity are often rendered more palatable by employing strategic ambiguity or euphemistic language (Krzyżanowski, 2020). Central to this transformation is interdiscursivity, whereby discourses circulate across various social and institutional domains, reinforcing one another and making exclusionary narratives appear widespread and legitimate. Normalisation also unfolds through strategic incrementalism, as actors introduce controversial rhetoric gradually, framing it as common sense or a necessary response to societal concerns, thereby shifting the boundaries of acceptable public discourse (Krzyżanowski, 2020). Both media and political elites play a crucial role in this process: by amplifying or adopting populist narratives, they contribute to their mainstreaming and reduce critical resistance (Krzyżanowski, 2020). Ultimately, for Krzyżanowski, normalisation is not merely a linguistic phenomenon but a broader socio-political dynamic that contributes to the erosion of democratic norms by embedding discriminatory or illiberal ideologies into everyday political life (Krzyżanowski, 2020).

This research focuses on the two discursive shifts that lead to normalisation. The first, enactment, involves the strategic introduction of discourse into the public sphere through processes of recontextualisation. In this phase, new discursive elements – such as themes, arguments, and supporting linguistic forms – are deployed to establish connections between broader, often transnational, discursive frameworks. This stage marks the initial dissemination of wider ideological constructs, which are adapted to fit particular actors and settings. The second stage, gradation or perpetuation, entails the further diffusion and reinforcement of the newly introduced discourse across multiple social fields, genres, and communicative spaces. This phase involves the movement of discourse from its primary context – typically where it first emerged, such as the political domain – through various carrier discourses, into secondary or target contexts. Through this multi-step process, discourse reaches new domains, gradually taking root and becoming normalised in these new contexts.

2.2 Civilisational Populism, Judeo-Christian Roots and European Parties

Although the parties examined in these studies have followed different trajectories, they are all aligned with right-wing ideologies.[2] All of them can be considered populist to some extent,[3] and share varying degrees of sovereigntism, anti-elitism, anti-immigration stances and Euroscepticism (even though the latter is largely dependent on context). The attitude to Christianity, however, is not homogeneous among them, albeit with variations in time. Founded in 2018, the National Rally is a long-lasting party that traces its ideological roots to the National Front (Front National) and the neofascist party Italian Social Movement. Its extreme ideology has been progressively softened (or ‘de-demonized’[4]), particularly after Marine Le Pen took over from her father in 2011, and so far, has been advocating traditional French secularism. Like the National Rally, Brothers of Italy is a relatively young party (it was founded in 2012) with indirect ideological roots in the Italian Social Movement; unlike the French counterpart, however, it is overtly pro-Christian. The League’s trajectory has been widely shifting: It emerged in the mid-Eighties as the Lombard League (Lega Lombarda), a regionalist and secessionist party; it then turned into a rightist, conservative, and nationalist entity starting from 2014 with Salvini as its leader. This transformation also involved a shift from some form of agnosticism, and even paganism, to a more pronounced Catholic identity. Reform UK is remarkably young, having started as Brexit Party before being renamed Reform UK in 2021, and does not openly declare any religious stance.

The ideological affiliation of these parties, combined with the variety of populist features ascribed to them, opens up further considerations about the construction of the ingroup-outgroup divide. As observed by Betz (2004: 7), in the 1990s “the issues of migration and multiculturalism gradually assumed a central position, both in terms of political marketing and political programmes. As a result, right-wing populist parties have increasingly marketed themselves as – and have been seen as – primarily anti-foreigner, or, perhaps more precisely, ‘anti-foreignization’ parties.” This strand can be best understood as a form of exclusionary populism. At its core, it promotes a narrow definition of citizenship, asserting that true democracy requires a culturally – or even ethnically – homogeneous society. It views only long-term citizens as full members of the community and believes that social benefits should go exclusively to those who have significantly contributed (Betz, 2004: 8). In its more extreme expressions, this ideology manifests as cultural nativism, which does not focus on ethnic superiority but on protecting cultural identity and traditional values from perceived foreign threats (Betz, 2004: 8).

More recently, exclusionary populism has targeted Islam as the putative Other on the grounds of a defence of liberal ‘Western’ values as opposed to obscurantism. Following Mudde’s definition, in this ‘civilisational’ form of populism (Yilmaz, 2023), the nation and its people are considered to be under threat from foreign cultures, while treacherous domestic elites allegedly help them to infiltrate society and erode its fundamental values and identity (Yilmaz, 2023). In the case of European parties, Christianity is adopted for merely identitarian purposes: the religion is turned into “a civilizational identity understood in antithetical opposition to Islam. (…) Liberalism – specifically, philosemitism, gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech – is selectively embraced as a characterization of ‘our’ way of life in constitutive opposition to the illiberalism that is represented as inherent in Islam” (Brubaker, 2017). This shared European cultural identity – which coincides with (and is reduced to) religion – is propagated as ‘Judeo-Christian’ tradition.

Quite interestingly, this label was not conceived in Europe, but in the United States, with the aim to promote religious tolerance and to forge a common moral framework against the backdrop of rising secularism and Communism, and preserve the memory of the Holocaust (Silk, 1984). The concept was used to assert a moral consensus among Jews and Christians, especially in opposition to totalitarian ideologies, and to reinforce a sense of national unity. According to Silk (1984), in the late 19th century the term described historical links between Judaism and Christianity. In the 1930s and 1940s, it emerged as a rhetorical response to fascism and anti-Semitism, promoted by liberal Protestant groups as a symbol of democratic and moral values shared by Jews and Christians. During World War II and the Cold War, ‘Judeo-Christian’ became a unifying label in American civil religion, used by political figures such as President Eisenhower to highlight a spiritual foundation for democracy in contrast to the atheism of communism.

By the 1960s and 1970s, the notion of Judeo-Christian tradition began to lose credibility (Silk, 1984). Critics noted that its rise had been driven more by political and cultural needs than by genuine theological agreement. The postwar emphasis on consensus gave way to new movements focused on pluralism and ethnic identity; at the same time, America’s moral and spiritual confidence, once bolstered by this shared religious rhetoric, eroded amid disillusionment over Vietnam, civil rights struggles, and critiques of Western imperialism: the very consensus the term once celebrated was now viewed as complacent or complicit. Despite its diminished intellectual standing, however, the expression did not disappear and continued to be used in political discourse, especially among conservative religious groups (Silk, 1984).

The use of the term in contemporary political discourse in Europe, therefore, embeds some evident contradictions. First, the label chosen to define European cultural unity was conceived in – and instrumental to – a completely different historical and political context. Second, parties recall Judeo-Christian roots to defend civilisation in one of the most secularised areas in the world – Europe. However, “[i]n this civilizational perspective, secularism is not a tendency to be combatted; it is a value to be defended – and one that has grown precisely on Christian soil. If ‘they’ are religious (in suspect ways) because they are Muslim, ‘we’ are secular because we are (post) Christian” (Brubaker, 2017). The case of the National Rally is exemplary to this respect, as they transitioned from a secularist stance to using the Judeo-Christian tradition as a defence of secular rights. The third contradiction lies in the nature of the rights to be defended, which are precisely the same that rightist parties frequently accuse of undermining the traditional foundations of society. In fact, European rightist parties have embraced different positions, following local traditions and orientations, as a stronghold against alleged Muslim ‘obscurantism’ – from the endorsement of same-sex marriages in the Netherlands to the defence of gender equality as a traditional European value (Brubaker, 2017).

Overall, the positions on civil rights remain wavering and subject to oscillations in time, as is the defence of secularism. That invoking Judeo-Christian roots to defend secular rights poses serious questions of consistency in the parties’ discourse is exemplified by evident shifts in their trajectories, as we shall see. The National Rally appears to be signalling a new interest in religion. The League has evolved from an agnostic party to one that defends Christianity, but was often in opposition to late Pope Francis, whose humanitarian stance on migration frequently clashed with the party’s hardline rhetoric (the Vatican has repeatedly criticized Salvini for his treatment of migrants arriving on Italian shores). Brothers of Italy and the League, in power since 2022, have shifted from the triad of ‘God, motherland, family,’ one of the most significant mottos of the Fascist regime, to fewer references, mostly during official events.[5] The results presented in the following section will respond precisely to this need of finding a trajectory in the evolution of civilisationism across Western Europe.

3.   Materials and Methods

3.1 Data Sets and Sources

The results presented in this article summarise the outcomes of different studies, which cover the years 2021 and 2024. As anticipated, the material was analysed for different studies and, consequently, is multifarious and concerns a variety of media:

·      2021: 270 Twitter/X posts from January to December; sections of the official website of the parties (self-descriptions, manifestos, political campaigns, billboards);

·       2024: 420 Instagram posts from January to December; sections of the official website of the parties (self-descriptions, manifestos, political campaigns, billboards).[6]

The first data set corresponds to the corpus originally selected for manual analysis for the book Appraisal, Sentiment and Emotion Analysis in Political Discourse (Combei & Reggi, 2024: 41-42). The data set of 2024 was compiled by selecting all posts on the official accounts of parties and party leaders that mentioned or referred to religion or labelled migrants with reference to their religious beliefs. Materials from websites was retrieved based on the same criteria as 2021, namely that they present the party, its history and programme.

The selection of material from social media and websites alike corresponds to the need to provide a general overview of the communication of the parties and their leaders. While official websites still offer a repository of essential information and downloadable material, social media provide the ideal platform for freedom of expression and resistance to censorship as they eliminate traditional gatekeeping mechanisms and foster a more intimate form of communication. The viral potential of online messages, combined with the absence of a universally accepted framework regulating published content, has made social media a breeding ground for populism as they tend to exacerbate political polarisation and reinforce echo chambers: Users typically follow accounts aligned with their political views, and platform algorithms often prioritize content that mirrors users’ existing beliefs and interests (KhosraviNik, 2017). For this reason, there has been a general shift from traditional media – such as newspapers and television, which support one-directional communication – to interactive platforms where politicians can engage in real-time with constituents, assess public sentiment, and adjust their messaging accordingly. This dynamic is particularly advantageous for populist leaders, who, as role models, define the boundaries between ingroup and outgroup, reinforcing the ideological divide: they exploit the participatory aspects of social media to construct their version of ‘the people’ and to circumvent the editorial filters of legacy media outlets (Gerbaudo, 2018; Higgins & Smith, 2014; Thompson, 2020).

Due to their dishomogeneity, the data sets are not suitable for a straightforward comparison but provide interesting insight into the evolution of political propaganda. Indeed, the choice of the years 2021 and 2024 is primarily motivated by their significance as pivotal in recent political developments: 2021 saw the intensive campaigning of the following year for the presidential elections in France and the general elections in Italy; 2024 saw the legislative elections in France, the general elections in the United Kingdom and the EU elections. This time span provides valuable data to make hypotheses about the evolution of party propaganda, particularly in relation to their political trajectories. The list below shows the vote share/projection in 2021 and 2024:

• National Rally: 25% → 34%

• Brothers of Italy: 16% → 30% (in power since 2022)

• League: 24% → 9%

• Reform UK: 3% → 24% (projection - source: Politico.eu[7])

Changes in the organisation of the parties involved have also required that the communication of different protagonists be analysed in the two data sets. Farage, for example, is absent in the 2021 material since the leader of Reform UK at the time was Tice, but is present in the data set of 2024 as he took over from him for the general elections. Similarly, Bardella was absent in the first data set as the leader of the National Rally was Le Pen, but is analysed as the incumbent leader of the party in 2024.

It is worth noting that in the time span under examination, some websites have undergone significant updating and/or restyling, so part of the material is not available anymore. If the website of the National Rally, for example, still offers the complete range of leaflets and posters, Brothers of Italy’s was thoroughly restyled during the campaign for the political elections, and much material analysed in these studies cannot be retrieved. For this reason, for a few examples the source will not be quoted as it is not available anymore.

3.2 Methods

All the analyses were carried out qualitatively by means of manual annotations, but part of the results were compared to those obtained by parallel quantitative analysis (Combei & Reggi, 2024, chapters 5-6).

The methodological framework was carefully chosen to shed light on how right-wing populist leaders strategically craft ingroup and outgroup identities, their public personas as role models, and reinforce ideological narratives. In order to answer the research questions, the analyses consider a range of elements, including emotional appeals, evaluative language, and image composition, to assess how political messages are structured. Specifically, the study examines basic emotions such as anticipation, trust, anger, fear, sadness, disgust, surprise, and joy (Plutchik, 1991), evaluation of people (judgement) and things and events (appreciation) drawing upon Martin and White’s Appraisal theory (2005). These methods were applied to verbal and visual resources such as emojis and images. For the manual annotations of the 2021 data set Multimodal Analysis Video and Multimodal Analysis Image tools were used (Combei & Reggi, 2024: 53), whereas the data set of 2024 was analysed by means of the Atlas.ti software (see Figure 1).

The reason for investigating different sets of resources, or modes, is twofold. First of all, discourse is the semiotic element of social practices and, as such, contains visual, textual and aural components (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 38), particularly as far as online communication is concerned. On the other hand, voters tend to form their political opinions and preferences less through the content of candidates’ speeches and more through non-verbal cues – such as physical appearance, body language and gestures. To obtain a more thorough analysis of institutional communication, some samples of complex visuals such as photographs and drawings (billboards), were also examined according to principles of visual semiotics, including gaze, colour, and compositional arrangement (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006), as exemplified in Figure 2.

Given the variety of materials and methods, and the limited space available, the discussion focuses on the most significant results and the most illustrative cases that better meet the scope of this overview.

4.   Findings and Discussion

The general results of the studies show that emotions play a crucial role in identity building, in line with the style of populist rhetoric, especially in the case of the ingroup, which is prevalently built around trust, both through leader representations in official settings and supportive imagery. Trust is elicited through the leaders’ decisionism, which is of paramount importance in the shifting, fuzzy landscape of populist politics, which encourages and promotes multiple identities based on contingent propagandist needs: “[b]ecause of the cacophony of meanings, this act of stabilization can only be performed by the leader of the chain through a decisionist act – a monological act of naming – rather than through an enlarged process of deliberation” (Ballacci & Goodman, 2023). Decisionism transpires through statements such as ‘we will defend what we are’ (‘difenderemo quello che siamo’ – Meloni[8]), ‘I won’t let anyone lecture me anymore’ (‘Je ne me laisserai plus donner des leçons’ – Le Pen[9]), ‘let’s build tomorrow’s France together’(‘construisons ensemble la France de demain’ – Le Pen[10]), ‘only Reform UK will end the British economy’s addiction to cheap foreign labour’ (Tice[11]). Regarding appraisal, the use of trust is mirrored by positive judgement in terms of capacity and ethical values: ‘Only Reform UK will stop the boats’ – Tice[12]; ‘Je ferai tout pour éradiquer cette idéologie barbare qu’est l’islamisme’ (‘I will do all I can to uproot this barbaric ideology that is Islamism’ – Le Pen[13]).

The second most represented emotion associated to the ingroup is joy, especially visually in the portraits of Meloni as a Prime Minister, Salvini and Farage, but also of Bardella and Le Pen, while Tice is mostly portrayed with serious expressions. The case of Meloni is particularly interesting, as it highlights the chameleon-like nature of populist politics. Meloni’s portrait, indeed, shows a remarkable change between materials of 2021 and 2024, namely after the year of her campaign for (and election as) Prime Minister 2022: a notable shift between the image of an oppositional leader and the positive, conciliatory or celebratory tones of an aspiring Prime Minister. Meloni has abandoned the stern direct gaze and crossed arms of the photos in the billboards of the past to embrace the role of the grounded leader with a hopeful outlook. She has abandoned her frowning expression conveying indignation and emotional solidarity with the audience, for a more joyful expression and a contemplative glance towards the future (top-right side of the photograph) – perhaps following Le Pen’s long-established style.[14]

On the other hand, Le Pen’s representation in posters and leaflets does not seem to have significantly changed in time. Her gaze still conveys both detachment and a sense of aspirational orientation toward what is ideal and elevated. She embodies positivity through her reassuring smile and forward-looking posture, symbolizing a vision for France’s future, while her gaze rarely engages with the viewer. The message of superiority and leadership is reinforced by the frequent use of abstract, monochromatic backgrounds—particularly the official blue featured prominently in campaign materials, which contributes to this quasi-mystical aura.[15]  

Anger – expressed visually and verbally – follows by a wide margin, even though it reflects in the photographs and videos of most leaders when talking about political opponents, with the exception of Farage and Bardella, who generally keep quite a calm demeanour. Possibly the most interesting example is offered by Tice’s video series called Tice’s Take and Sunday Sermon, both streamed on YouTube channels.[16] While the latter is designed as TV news broadcast, each short video of ‘Tice’s Take’ serves the purpose of sharing his perspective on a hot-button topic – from climate change and immigration to gender debates and protests. Thus, the concept of sex and gender are skilfully confused to reject the gender debate, CO2 is defined as ‘food plant,’ and the housing crisis is blamed upon ‘mass immigration.’[17] In these unfiltered commentaries on current affairs, Tice addresses the audience in the tone of an ordinary person trying to persuade someone of a pressing concern: a relentless rhythm, irony, simplification (e.g., ‘0.4% of 1% is like one limb in one person in Wembley Stadium of 100,000’), and colloquialisms such as ‘bloke,’ ‘get a grip’ or ‘for heaven’s sake’ are used undermine the ‘mainstream narrative’ or reinterpret scientific facts. Even when his controversial views are meant to reassure the audience – such as the claim that carbon dioxide is not harmful – his gaze (frowning, direct), facial expression, tone of voice, and nonverbal language (he often gestures with a pointed finger) convey resentment and urgency. This emotionally charged tone is further amplified by text overlays, featuring statements in capital letters and keywords boxed in black.

By contrast, discussions of the outgroup are dominated by fear and anger, and the evaluations tend to be more nuanced than those directed at the ingroup. Anger is especially addressed to political adversaries accused of mismanaging immigration policies. To this regard, Le Pen’s frequent references to Taguieff’s ‘Islamo-leftism’ (‘islamo-gauchisme’)[18]exemplify very well the alleged convergence between leftist politics and Islamist ideologies, particularly in academic or activist circles. This connection is also present in Tice’s communication, which often insists on the lack of ‘common sense’ in the government – whether Labour or Tory – who released ‘nasty,’ ‘foreign’ criminals, or accuses the ‘Toxic Tory’ of ‘immigration betrayal’ because of ‘mass immigration that wasn’t planned for’ and has left everyone ‘worse off.’[19]

Political adversaries are therefore evaluated as incapable of addressing critical issues (negative judgement/capacity) or lacking the moral status to do so (negative judgement/propriety): ‘your lot [the Conservatives] just haven’t got the guts and the spine to do it [stop the boats]’ (Tice[20]), ‘blood on the hands of the government, the Home Secretary, the Prime Minister and all of these people who will not do this [send the boats back]’ (Tice[21]), ‘the government has refrained from explicitly naming Islamism (…) in order to orchestrate its neutralization’ (‘Le gouvernement a renoncé à désigner l’islamisme (…) pour en organiser sa neutralisation’ – Le Pen[22]). Quite exemplary to this respect is the Trieste Theses(Tesi di Trieste), Brothers of Italy’s manifesto of 2017,[23] in which the EU is severely judged as allegedly betraying the cultural roots of the continent, while, at the same time, allowing a true ethnic substitution: ‘A Europe that, by denying its Judeo-Christian and classical roots, subordinates the identity and autonomy needs of its peoples to those of a radical universalism aligned with an abstract multiculturalist principle – one that also justifies the indiscriminate and uncontrolled influx of people from other continents in numbers that amount to a real and true ethnic replacement’ (‘Un’Europa che negando le sue radici giudaico-cristiane e classiche, subordina le esigenze di identità e autonomia dei popoli a quelle di un universalismo radicale che opera in sintonia con un astratto principio multiculturalista, da cui deriva anche l’assenso all’indiscriminato e incontrollato accesso di persone da altri continenti in numeri che prefigurano una vera e propria sostituzione etnica’).

The rhetorical strategies associated to the outgroup-migrants are more complex. Overall, the prevailing emotion is fear, which is evoked lexically, through words like terrorism, jihad, crime, illegal, bloodstained, and visually through graphic representations of masked Islamic State fighters, ships loaded of migrants (archive images mostly unrelated with current events) and the widespread use of black and red to elicit a sense of tension and danger. An interesting example is offered by Salvini and the League’s recent, recurrent use of news reports highlighting crimes committed by migrants. Here the tones are extremely dramatic and the region of origin of the perpetrators is emphasized, even when such details were absent in the original media headlines or subtitles.

Exemplary is Salvini’s Instagram post of November 21, 2024 (@matteosalviniofficial), which features a seeming press release of Italian press agency ANSA titled ‘Pretends to comfort her after an argument and then assaults her – 24-year-old Egyptian man arrested’ (‘Finge di consolarla dopo una lite e la violenta, arrestato 24enne egiziano’). The title, in red and white, dramatically contrasts with the dark background of the photograph of a woman with her hand raised in a defensive gesture, suggesting violence. The image is completed by Salvini’s comment, which associates immigration to increased sexual violence and questions Egypt’s classification as an unsafe country.[24] If we consider the original by the Italian press agency ANSA,[25] however, we notice that the photograph (two policemen behind their car), and the title of the press release do not highlight nationality of the perpetrator, which is mentioned only in the article: ‘Pretends to comfort her after an argument and assaults her, arrested. Carabinieri: 24-year-old held in custody after rape in San Benedetto’ (‘Finge di consolarla dopo una lite e la violenta, arrestato - Carabinieri, custodia per 24enne dopo uno stupro a San Benedetto’).

If the negative judgement addressed to the outgroup-adversaries is explicit, in the case of migrants it is transferred as negative appreciation to a general phenomenon, by means of the linguistic processes of nominalisation and abstraction. These rhetorical strategies allow the speakers to transfer unfavourable evaluations to events, concepts, or abstract entities linked to Islam and migration without, in fact, expressing any direct judgement about the people involved. Thus, it is the abstract concept of immigration that is labelled as illegal by Meloni (‘counter illegal immigration’ – ‘contrastare l’immigrazione illegale’[26]), Farage condemns the ‘broken immigration system,’ Le Pen criticises ‘this new totalitarianism that is Islamism’ (‘ce nuoveau totalitarisme que est l’islamisme’[27]), Brothers of Italy says ‘no to the Islamisation of Europe’ (‘no all’islamizzazione dell’Europa’)[28] Salvini talks about ‘Islamic fanaticism’ (‘fanatismo islamico’[29]) and Tice claims that ‘multiculturalism doesn’t work.’[30] Exemplary is his call ‘stop the boats,’  a synecdoche that objectifies and dehumanises the entire movement of people, which is reduced to and symbolised by their means of transportation.

Overall, nominalisation and abstraction serve several purposes. First, by deleting the agent, they remove moral responsibility. Second, they soften the speaker’s evaluative claim by attributing it to abstract concepts rather than individuals. Moreover, in some cases they can also contribute to the creation of memorable slogans, as is the case of Tice’s call to stop the boats. Finally, abstraction elevates the register of statements and broadens their applicability, enhancing the speaker’s perceived authority.

If overall emotions and evaluation strategies appear quite similar over time, the analysis of the two data sets from an ideational point of view seems to have evolved significantly, reflecting shifting priorities and political calculations. The association of ingroup and outgroup identity with specific categories or concepts is pivotal in framing the narrative. Framing, as defined by Goffman (1974), refers to the process of selecting certain aspects of perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicative context, thereby promoting a particular causal interpretation or moral evaluation. This concept is crucial in understanding how political leaders craft their narratives to shape public opinion and influence political discourse implicitly, that is, without recurring to evaluative language that may be filtered by media gatekeeping.

Until 2021, Judeo-Christian roots were directly and indirectly invoked by some leaders and parties to define the ingroup, sometimes employing strong visual and rhetorical cues to solidify their alignment with religious traditions. Exemplary are the references to the Judeo-Christian tradition in the Trieste Theses, as well as Salvini’s and Meloni’s vocal declarations on rallies and social media (Combei & Reggi, 2024: 66; Evolvi, 2023). Salvini frequently displayed religious symbols, such as kissing the cross during public appearances, (Caiani & Carvalho, 2021), while Meloni emphasized her identity as a Christian mother, linking her personal faith to her nationalist vision. This identity – forged after the Fascist triad God-homeland-family mentioned above – was launched as a slogan at a national rally of the centre-right coalition in 2019: ‘I’m Giorgia, I’m a woman, I’m a mother, I’m Italian, I’m Christian’ (‘Sono Giorgia, sono una donna, sono una madre, sono italiana, sono Cristiana’)[31] soon became so popular that Meloni also presented it in Spanish at a rally of Vox in 2021.[32] These claims also concerned policy debates, such as defending the nativity scene in schools, especially when inclusion policies led to its discouragement or outright bans by school administrators. Thus, in 2015 she declared that ‘[t]he crucifix, the nativity scene, and the Easter blessing are symbols of our civilization’ (‘crocifisso, presepe, benedizione pasquale sono simboli della nostra civiltà’[33]), and a few years later she called for the defence of our classical and Christian roots (‘difendere le nostre radici classiche e cristiane’[34]) against Islamisation. In contrast, Le Pen and National Rally largely avoided religious declarations and did not frame ingroup identity within Christian terms in defence of the long-proclaimed secularism of the French tradition.

Interestingly, around the same period, also Reform UK projected a preacher-like persona through his Sunday Sermonvideos, where he delivered political messages in a quasi-religious style, despite lacking explicit references to faith.[35]Broadcast for the first time in May 2022, the series recalled Christian rituals not only in its title, but also the repertoire of visual symbols and music. The opening sequence consisted in the image of a dramatic sky scene where sunlight beams break through thick, partially illuminated clouds, creating visible rays of light streaming downward (see Figure 2). A closeup of Richard Tice appeared, while liturgical organ music was playing. These elements gave the scene – and the speaker – a heavenly or spiritual quality, which served the purpose of legitimising the claims of the talk while implicitly appealing to Christian traditions.      

The definition of the outgroup in 2021 saw a variety of actors and concepts: Roma camps, multiculturalism/ethnic substitution, human trafficking, migrants who do not integrate and birthright citizenship (Brothers of Italy and the League); Islamism and terrorism (National Rally); ‘illegal’ migrants and the EU (Reform UK). By 2024, some of these patterns had shifted. The religious fervour once presents in Salvini and Meloni’s rhetoric had noticeably diminished. References to Christianity were largely reserved for official occasions, such as Meloni’s engagement with the Pope during a G8 summit or her simple well-wishes during Christian festivities like All Saints’ Day. Salvini, once highly demonstrative of his religious convictions, had significantly reduced his references to faith, limited to recalling religious festivities without the overt displays of devotion of previous years.

Judeo-Christian roots are now scarcely mentioned – if at all – in Brothers of Italy’s material, which does not feature the Trieste Theses anymore. The opening sequence of Tice’s Sunday Sermon, too, changed in the 2024 data set, featuring a news broadcast format more in line with the content while retaining the original title.[36] On the other hand, Le Pen seems to have moved in the opposite direction, at times incorporating explicit signs of devotion, such as lighting candles in churches,[37] which may signal a possible strategic embrace of religious symbolism to appeal to a broader conservative electorate.

Overall, the parties and their leaders have abandoned their original positions of radical devotion on one side and absolute secularism on the other to embrace a vague, catch-all, definition of the ingroup as a British or European community with a few references to Judeo-Christian roots.[38] This interpretation of  ‘lay’ religion as civilisation is employed strategically depending on political needs and electoral positioning, as a source of differentiation from the (uncivil) Other.

Data suggest that the framing of the outgroup also shifted, with significant changes in the way immigration and Islam are discussed. Interestingly, we notice the equivalence of immigration with Islam, whereas in the past references to other communities were also present. By 2024, for example, Brothers of Italy had largely abandoned references to the Roma community, refocusing its discourse on the association between immigration and Islam. The party has also clearly moved from emphasizing immigration as a threat – especially through aggressive, emotional visual campaigns – to the equivalence of illegal immigration and human trafficking and focusing on political strategies to counter it. In many cases there have been shifts towards ‘commonsensical’ polarisation between ‘good’ migrants (legal and culturally integrated) and ‘bad’ migrants (criminals, illegal or not integrated). It is true that already in 2022 the first two ‘measures’ proposed by the National Rally in their online programme focused on stopping uncontrolled immigration and uprooting Islamistideologies through a bill (Proposition de loi).[39] However, data suggest that these instrumental distinctions have increased in time, so that current discourse is progressively linked to gender-based violence, human trafficking, social order and economic threats by the National Rally, Brothers of Italy, and the League and their leaders to various degrees.

Discourse on terrorism remains present, especially in the discourse of the National Rally, which frequently refers to the Islamist ideology (‘idéologie islamiste’ – Le Pen[40]), but it has become somewhat less prominent compared to concerns about crime and social security. Thus, social media abound with claims that ‘the link between immigration and insecurity is an obvious fact for 68% of the French’ (‘le lien entre l’immigration et l’insécurité est une évidence pour 68% des Français’ – National Rally[41]) and graphs showing the increase of foreign inmates.[42] Interestingly, the use of visuals explicitly referring to the alien Other has decreased significantly for the French party and Brothers of Italy becoming more argumentative and complex, whereas Salvini and the League still employ extensive visual material, opting for a more emotional and immediate communication with their audience.

Reform UK, on the other hand, frames immigration only as an issue of protection of the local culture and governmental control. Unlike the French and Italian leaders, in the data set of Tice and Farage, we do not observe any explicit reference to Islam.[43] The party has reinforced the narrative that immigration represents an unchecked problem that threatens British traditions and national identity, with multiculturalism depicted as a source of civil unrest, and references to riots and increasing social tensions: ‘disgraceful scenes in London and Leeds last night rioting on massive scale Multiculturalism has more than failed’ (Tice[44]). Additionally, immigration is positioned as an economic threat, particularly in terms of security and competition for jobs and public resources: ‘just deport 10,000 foreign criminals blocking our jails & costing us taxpayers billions’ (Tice[45]); ‘the British economy has a deadly addiction to cheap, foreign Labour’ (Tice[46]).

Overall, the framing of the outgroup as a security and economic issue reflects a trajectory towards the normalisation of populist discourse, moving from overt emotional appeals to more institutionalized and policy-driven rhetoric. Divisive language has been integrated into mainstream political discourse by becoming abstract (immigration, multiculturalism), addressed to specific sub-categories of foreigners (criminals, illegal migrants), or decentralised to the wrong choices of political opponents.

5.   Concluding Remarks

This work showed that the civilisational form of populism is still present and active in three of the first four most populated countries in Western Europe.[47] Religion has been instrumentally deprived of its supranatural core and turned into an identitarian factor that discriminates the ‘good,’ socially acceptable ‘us’ from the ‘bad,’ socially unacceptable ‘them.’ Within this domain of social unacceptability and danger, all equations are possible: between Islam and Islamism, religious diversity and social unrest, immigration and economic crisis, according to political agendas and national backgrounds. 

The studies, however, also highlight the evolving nature of right-wing populist discourse in Europe. While earlier rhetoric relied on visual and emotional provocations, contemporary strategies favour rationalized, policy-oriented arguments. This shift facilitates the normalisation of divisive narratives, embedding them within political debates. However, inconsistencies remain, particularly regarding the treatment of Christian identity across different parties. The National Rally paradoxically transitioned from a secularist stance to using Christianity as a defence of secular rights, possibly following a return to religious faith in France in recent years.[48] The League evolved from an agnostic party with pagan undertones to one that defends Christianity – albeit with decreasing intensity – often in opposition to late Pope Francis, whose humanitarian stance on migration clashed with the party’s hardline rhetoric. Also, Brothers of Italy seems to have abandoned overt devotion in favour of fewer references to Christianity, mostly during official events or festivities. Reform UK, meanwhile, has moved from Tice’s preacher-like persona to a more ‘secular’ approach. The discourse surrounding Islam has also evolved. While the emotions elicited remain unchanged, the topics and frequency of anti-Islamic discourse have shifted towards anti-human trafficking efforts, and safety and economic concerns.

Despite party-specific differences, the overarching trend suggests a general process of normalisation, even for the League and Salvini, notwithstanding their divisive and radical approach, which relies heavily on emotional imagery and highly polarized rhetoric – possibly in response to the declining popularity of their party. This trend does not signify a decline in divisive rhetoric but rather a shift toward making exclusionary discourse appear more natural and legitimate, following the discursive shifts theorised by Krzyżanowski.

Enactment has been taking place through the use (and definition) of ‘commonsensical’ concepts such as the opposition good migrants/bad migrants, abstract concepts such as totalitarianism and multiculturalism, stock phrases and coinages (Islamo-leftism, the boats), and a shift in focus to human trafficking and crimes against women.

Gradation/perpetuation has been achieved through a variety of strategies. For example, the shift away from highly visual content signals a transition toward a more rationalized and official mode of argumentation. Also, the incorporation of a discriminatory approach to illegal immigration into legislative initiatives directly addresses this very need. Additionally, migration discourse has become more decentralized and transient, shifting from formal statements to interviews and remarks made by lower-profile party members – particularly evident in Meloni’s communication strategy as a governing leader. Exemplary to this respect is the re-styling of Brothers of Italy’s website, with the consequent removal of ‘inconvenient’ posters and transfer of the inflammatory Trieste Theses to Meloni’s own website.

Future research should further investigate the trajectories of populist parties’ discourse with reference to their electoral trajectory. It should also shed light on the long-term implications of this normalisation process on democratic institutions and the broader societal consequences of these developments, particularly the potential impact of embedding exclusionary narratives into mainstream political debates.

Footnotes

[1] This definition has been adopted here and elsewhere in this study as an umbrella term for operational reasons, in order to account for similarities and shared worldviews in these parties’ programmes. For a more in-depth discussion of the origins and ideological affiliation of Brothers of Italy, League, National Rally and Reform UK, see Combei and Reggi (2024: 1-9 and 56-73).   

[2] In my work to the present day, I have opted for the general definition of ‘right,’ without further distinctions between ‘right’ and ‘hard’ or ‘far’ right, which, albeit extremely insightful, I do not consider relevant for the purpose of my research.

[3] For a discussion on the populist characteristics of these parties, see Combei and Reggi, 2023: 70-72.

[4] Bouchez, Yann (November 27, 2023). “‘Dédiabolisation’ in ‘Le Monde,’ a winning strategy for the Rassemblement National.” Le Monde.https://www.lemonde.fr/en/m-le-mag/article/2023/11/27/dediabolisation-in-le-monde-a-winning-strategy-for-the-rassemblement-national_6291381_117.html (last accessed: November 2025).

[5] For a discussion on Italian parties and the Catholic Church, see Caiani, M., & Carvalho, T. (2021). The use of religion by populist parties: the case of Italy and its broader implications. Religion, State and Society, 49(3), 211–230. https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2021.1949935

[6] The shift from Twitter/X to Instagram was due to the controversies sparked by the change in gatekeeping rules of Twitter after Elon Musk’s acquisition, and the increased popularity of Instagram for both the institutional and the personal communication of political leaders.

[7] https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/united-kingdom/ (last accessed November 2025).

[8] @giorgiameloni, Instagram, April 29, 2024.

[9] @marine_lepen, Instagram, March 27, 2024.

[10] https://archives.rassemblementnational.fr/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Construisons-ensemble-la-France-de-demain.pdf (last accessed November 2025).

[11] @tice_richard, Instagram, June 5, 2024.

[12] @tice_richard, Instagram, January 17, 2024, September 3, 2024.

[13] @MLP_officiel, Twitter, November 8, 2021.

[14] Posters of 2021 are no longer available on Brothers of Italy’s website, so a purely indicative example of the difference in Meloni’s communication can be viewed at https://www.giorgiameloni.it/2021/01/14/governo-meloni-elezioni-subito-che-non-si-possa-votare-e-una-menzogna/  (for 2021) and https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=944748917018652&set=pb.100044506566624.-2207520000&type=3 (for 2024); last accessed November 2025).

[15] https://rassemblementnational.fr/tracts (last accessed November 2025)

[16] ‘Tice’s Take’ is released on his own channel; the ‘Sunday Sermon’ was previously broadcast on TalkTV, whereas now is streamed on GBNews.

[17]https://www.youtube.com/shorts/1IUMrd88huQ, https://www.youtube.com/shorts/-jCq0KNoGVk,  https://www.youtube.com/@TiceRichard (last accessed November 2025).

[18] @MLP_officiel, Twitter, 1 August, 2024. The term was originally coined by Pierre-André Taguieff in 2002 in his work La nouvelle judéophobie.

[19] @tice_richard, Instagram, February 29, 2024.

[20] @tice_richard, Instagram, January 17, 2024.

[21] @tice_richard, Instagram, September 3, 2024. See also the interview to Tice on GB News https://www.gbnews.com/news/richard-tice-labour-have-blood-on-their-hands-video (last accessed November 2025).

[22] @MLP_officiel, Twitter, January 29, 2021.

[23] Interestingly, the document featured in Brothers of Italy’s website of 2021, but it the meantime it has been moved to Meloni’s website: https://www.giorgiameloni.it/tesitrieste/ (last accessed November 2025).

[24] The classification of countries as ‘safe’ or ‘unsafe’ has an impact on repatriation procedures of migrants.   

[25] https://www.ansa.it/marche/notizie/2024/11/21/finge-di-consolarla-dopo-una-lite-e-la-violenta-arrestato_28173454-f43e-4162-b104-9eb4b3b23a20.html (last accessed November 2025)

[26] @giorgiameloni, Instagram, March 17, 2024.

[27] @MLP_officiel, Twitter, February 3, 2021.

[28] https://www.facebook.com/giorgiameloni.paginaufficiale/posts/la-nostra-identit%C3%A0-di-italiani-ed-europei-si-fonda-sulle-radici-classiche-e-cris/10157134611742645/ (last accessed November 2025).

[29] @matteosalviniofficial, Instagram, April 2, 2024.

[30] @tice_richard, Instagram, January 14, 2024.

[31] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUQjNu5K_k0 (last accessed November 2025).

[32] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47Sa5bcYYuI (last accessed November 2025).

[33] https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10153126676662645&id=38919827644&set=a.343277597644 (last accessed November 2025); see also @giorgiameloni, Twitter, May 15, 2019 and December 23, 2021.

[34]  https://www.facebook.com/giorgiameloni.paginaufficiale/posts/se-i-musulmani-pensano-di-portare-la-guerra-santa-in-casa-nostra-%C3%A8-arrivato-il-m/10157082154732645/ (last accessed November 2025)

[35] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0oYE1uaL2Ys/ (last accessed November 2025)

[36] See, for example, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WKUPkZGoXlc&list=PLA2T8B4OekbwrLOqDeUcRVfoKA-wXLSG3&index=3 (last accessed November 2025).

[37] An examples of this change is provided by @marine_lepen, Instagram, April 15, 2022.

[38] It is worth noting that more recently, in 2025, Farage has praised Judeo-Christian traditions (https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/feb/18/nigel-farage-calls-for-reindustrialisation-of-britain-and-higher-birthrates - last accessed November 2025), thus recalling his own statements of ten years before (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30776186 - last accessed November 2025).

[39] https://rassemblementnational.fr/22-mesures (last accessed November 2025).

[40] @marine_lepen, Instagram, September 9, 2024.

[41] @rassemblementnational_fr, Instagram, November 19, 2024.

[42] @jordanbardella, Instagram, May 14, 2024.

[43] The choice not to adopt a socially divisive attitude does not seem to be necessarily motivated by the presence of a remarkable percentage of Muslim citizens, as in the UK  they represent only 6% of the population, while in France they reach 10% (https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/muslim-population-by-country - last accessed November 2025).

[44] @tice_richard, Instagram, July 14, 2024.

[45] @tice_richard, Instagram, October 22, 2024.

[46] @tice_richard, Instagram, June 5, 2024.

[47] Source https://worldpopulationreview.com/continents/europe#europe-population-by-country (last accessed November 2025).

[48] https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/05/26/frances-improbable-adult-baptism-boom (last accessed November 2025).